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I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

FETAL RIGHTS

1.

823

A child has a cause of action based on the constitutional violation of his right to familial companionship
and society, even though a fetus at father's death.

Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991). John
Crumpton, a six year old boy, brought a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 against Los Angeles Police Chief
Daryl Gates, several former police chiefs, and various political
officials, including the Mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley.
Crumpton alleged that the killing of his father by an alleged
"death squad" team of the L.A. police department constituted
a violation of his own constitutional rights.
The district court granted summary judgment on the ground
that, because Crumpton was a fetus at the time his father
was killed, he was not a person within the meaning of § 1983,
and was therefore unable to bring the civil rights claim. The
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
holding that Crumpton's injury and cause of action did not arise
until his birth, and therefore he was entitled to proceed in his
civil rights claim. The case was one of first impression and the
court noted, "our research has uncovered no federal case on all
fours."2 Nevertheless, the court used common law tort principles, rejected the potential to impact the important principles
behind'Roe v Wade 3 and made a sound, thoughtful decision.
But, as this note will examine, potential dangers loom from the
decision: namely the potential implications for women and
their constitutional right to privacy.
The story begins on September 15, 1982, when a group of
police officers of the L.A. police department "death squad"
killed John Crumpton's father. The mission of the "death
squad" officers was to execute those criminals who were "escaping the arm of the law in that they were not being convicted for
crimes they had committed, and when convicted, their sentences were too short and/or inadequate."· At the time of his
father's death, Crumpton was a two-month old fetus.
1.
2
3.
4.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) [hereinafter § 19831.
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1419.
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Six years later, Crumpton brought a civil rights action for
his own damages sustained as a result of the loss of his father.
Under § 1983, Crumpton sought compensatory and punitive
damages based on violations of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights, namely an assertion of his substantive due process
rights based on the violation of his right to familial companionship and society.6
The applicable law, § 1983, does not create substantive
rights, it merely serves as the procedural device for enforcing
substantive provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes. 6
Thus, as the court indicated, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege an
independent basis for relief, namely a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute. 7 Here,
while the Fourth Amendment right of Crumpton's father "not
to be subjected to the use of excessive force" did not give rise
to Crumpton's own cause of action, in Smith v. City of Fontana 8 ,
the court allowed the decedent's children to assert a substantive due process claim based on the violation of their right to
familial companionship and society.9 The court in Fontana 10
characterized the child's interest as "a cognizable liberty interest which the state has no legitimate interest in interfering
with ... through the use of excessive force."11 Moreover, the
Crumpton court noted that congressional intent found in the
legislative history of § 1983's precursor, the Klu Klux Klan Act,
was to remedy the "wrongs, arsons, and murders done. "12 In
particular, this remedy was available for those children whose
father had been killed.
In addition to alleging "a deprivation of constitutional proportion"IS to sustain relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must be
a citizen of the United States or other "person."14 Indeed, "the
crux of this case ... ", according to the court, was "not the nature
5. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420. In addition, Crumpton sought injunctive relief
in the form of either an order that the "death squad" disband or court supervision of
"death squad" activities.
6. See, e.g. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979);
and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
7. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420.
8. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir.), cert. den'd 484 U.S.
935 (1987).
9.ld.
10. ld.
11. ld. at 1419·20.
12. ld. at 1421.
13. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1421.
14. [d.
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of the constitutional right asserted, but rather who may bring
a suit under § 1983."16 (emphasis added).
Defendants cited Roe v. Wade 18 to support their argument
that Crumpton was not a proper party to bring a cause of
action under § 1983. According to Roe 17 , the word "person" as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn. IS The defendants argued that because Crumpton was
a fetus at the time his father was killed, Crumpton was not a
"person" as contemplated by § 1983 and required under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, he was precluded from
raising a cause of action. The district court adopted this reasoning and granted summary judgment. The U.S. Court of
Appeals departed entirely from this line of reasoning and
found that Roe v Wade was "inapposite."IB "This case ... does
not involve a physical injury to a fetus. Here the substantive
constitutional injury upon which Crumpton relies is ... a substantive due process liberty interest in having familial relations
with a parent. "20
Despite the fact that the child was a fetus at the time of his
father's murder, the child's injury and cause of action for loss of
familial companionship arose at the time of his birth. 21 Thus,
according to the U.S., Crumpton was a "person" under the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution and therefore able to bring a
claim under § 1983. The court reached this conclusion by distinguishing the wrongful act of the father's murder from the actual injury it ultimately inflicted upon the little boy. The issue
framed by the court was not whether John Crumpton had any
rights while he was a fetus. Instead, in permitting him to bring
a claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his father, the
court focused on the common law tort concept that "although the
term 'wrongful act' is often thought to be synonymous with the
injury, if an injury does not result immediately, the cause of
action arises upon its occurrence."22
Similarly, although the wrongful act occurred while
Crumpton was in utero, the injury or suffering which flowed
15.Id.

16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
17. [d.
18. [d. at 158.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1421.
Id. at 1422.
Id.
Vaughn v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 822 F.2d 605, 609-10 (6th Cir.) (1987).
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from that wrongful act occurred postnatally. The focus of the
inquiry therefore was the time of injury. According to the
court: "[ w ]here a child claims unwarranted state interference
with his rights to familial companionship and society, the
injury to this right can only occur after birth since a familial
right cannot arise until a fetus is born and actually suffers from
not having a parent."23
The court's decision is sound and logical; it is supported by
applicable case law, particularly in the area of torts, and supported by the history and legislative intent of § 1983 to be
"broadly construed to effectuate remedial purposes."24 Yet, the
legal community has called this an "unusual legal ruling. "26 In
particular, the court failed to address the issue of whether a
fetus was a person, and left many unanswered questions about
the rights of a fetus to assert a § 1983 claim.
The court specifically avoided relying on Roe v. Wade 26 ,
thus "sidestepping the issue of whether a fetus should be considered a person with the right to sue in federal courts. "27 The
attorney who represented John Crumpton commented after
their victory: "the case now brings within the coverage of federal civil rights all persons who were in utero at the time that
injuries were inflicted on their parents."26 Has the court really sidestepped Roe 29 , or rather has the decision moved us closer to recognizing the fetus as a person, with all rights and
liberties espoused under the Constitution?30
While the court seems to agree with Roe v. Wade sl and its
reasoning that a fetus is not a person, the dicta is worrisome
23. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1422.
24. Id. at 1423.
25. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 15, 1991, at A·15, col. 4.
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
27. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 15, 1991, at A·15, col. 4.
28. Attorney Steven Yagman estimated, based on considerable research, that this
new cause of action amounts to about 10% of all the civil rights cases that could be filed
nationally. Phone conversation with Mr. Yagman (February 21,1992).
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
30. In an unrelated case involving allegations of excessive force and the rights
of unborn children, Mr. Yagman won a $415,229 award in May 1988. His plaintiff,
Brenda Cornwell, said a Riverside police officer punched her in the stomach when she
was three months pregnant during a party that had become raucous. The jury did not
award damages to the women's daughter, who was 18 months old. But the district court
judge presiding, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, issued a tentative ruling that constitutional
rights begin at conception.· (emphasis added) Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d
398 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3274 (1990).
31. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
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as it may contribute to the current trend of eroding women's
right to privacy as more courts begin to acknowledge the fetus
as a person. The current trend is that many states do provide
a cause of action for injury to a viable fetus, regardless of
whether it is later born alive. 32 In fact, one recent case noted
that "[a] majority of the states allow an action for wrongful
death of a viable fetus even when it is still born as a result of
prenatal injuries."33 Moreover, virtually every jurisdiction,
including California, currently allows children born to recover in tort for prenatal injuries caused by third parties. 84
One commentator noted: "[t]he inclusion of fetuses in the
group of persons protected by... tort law is not necessarily
inconsistent with the interests of the mother."36 Moreover,
"judicial recognition of a child's right to recover damages for tortious prenatal injury does not mean that the courts recognize
unborn fetuses as persons with full legal rights."36 Indeed, the
decision in Crumpton seems to suggest that they are interested
in protecting the interests of the damaged live born person
against third parties only, in this case, the police. As
another commentator noted: "The courts are not compensating
fetuses but are instead compensating children who need
32. Crumpton, 947 F.2d. at 1423.
33. Humes v. 'Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Kan. 1990). In Humes, the court reasoned that an unborn non viable fetus is not a person within the definition of the wrongful death act, and therefore incapable of bringing an action on its own behalf. A viable
fetus, on the other hand was a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful death
statute because it was capable of an independent existence and regarded as a separate entity." This is the position ofa majority of the states for determining standing
for wrongful death actions against third parties. See also Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1
(Kan. 1962).
34. International Union U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991)
(White, J. joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The right of recovery for a prenatal irijury inflicted by a third party
now appears to be well settled principle in tort law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 869 (I) (1977). See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, Prosser and
Keeton, § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984).
35. Kim, Reconciling Fetal/Maternal Conflicts, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 223 (1991)
[hereinafter Kim]. To a certain extent, laws that recognize fetal rights against third
parties, also protect the mother from having other people interfere or harm her pregnancy against her will. "Holding third parties responsible for the negligent or criminal destruction of fetuses is ... consistent with, and even enhances, the protection of
pregnant women's interests." See Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J.,
599, 603 [hereinafter Johnsen].
36. Nelson, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to
Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HAsTINGS L.J. 703, 733 (1986) [hereinafter Nelson].
See also, Glantz, Is the Fetus a PersonV A LAWYER'S VIEW, in ABORTION AND THE
STATUS OF THE FETUS 114 (W. H. ENGELHARDT, JR., S. SPICKER & D. WINSHIP ed. 1983).
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special medical treatment .... The point in pregnancy when
those acts occur does not serve to deflect the courts from their
rightful goal of compensating the injured child. "37 (emphasis
added).
But, this is where the danger lies: the recognition of fetal
rights which conflicts with the mother's privacy rights. While
the Crumpton principle does not address fetal rights per se,
does it have the potential to be a disguise for the same potential harm -is it the wolf in sheep's clothing? Under Crumpton
will a child now have a cause of action against hislher mother based on "the right to freedom from excessive force?" And
if so, does this ultimately conflict with women's privacy rights?
Many argue that the recognition of some legal protections
for the fetus does not transform the fetus into a person with full
legal rights. 38 A fetus mayor may not possess legal protections
depending on the legal context and the social policies at stake. 39
The reasoning in Crumpton indicates that, based on the societal context and remedial nature of § 1983, the court recognized
the importance of the constitutional right involved. By allowing Crumpton to proceed with a cause of action, there is the possibility of compensaton to a child for losing a father. It is
precisely the nature of the right involved, the rights to familial companionship and society, that forms the basis for
Crumpton's cause of action which the court narrowly defines
by distinguishing the rights of a fetus as compared with a
born child.
Despite the Court's ruling, which focused on a post-birth
"injury," the court seems willing to allow a c.ause of action to a
child for injuries sustained from prenatal activity while in
utero. (emphasis added). The court challenges the reasoning
behind Harman v. Daniels 4o , which established the principle
that a child cannot sue the police department for direct prenatal
37. Kim, supra note 34, at 229.
38. Johnsen, supra note 34.
39. The legal status of the fetus should be determined largely by the purpose of
the particular law in question, rather than by a particular philosophical view of
fetal -personhood." For example, the legal capacity of an unborn fetus, if born alive,
to inherit property is better understood as a way to fulfill the intentions of the testator,
a goal of inheritance law, than as recognition offetal personhood. And in the context
of tortious context, the law attempts to compensate the innocent victims of injury.
Nelson, supra note 35, iii; 739·740.
40. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981).
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injuries caused while in utero;n The Court notes in footnote,
that "we have grave doubts about the Harman 42 Court's proposition that an infant injured in utero and later born alive simply must bear their federally cognizable affiictions without the
hope of remedy."43 Indeed the Court recognizes "a right to
freedom from excessive force ... "44 and seems willing to hold third
parties liable under § 1983 for physical injuries caused to
fetuses where there is also injury at birth. Whether the right
to freedom from excessive force is a recognizable constitutional claim, the Court does not answer. While it seems logical and even justifiable to hold third parties, such as the
police, responsible for injuries to one's child, it is troubling in
the context of potential liability of a mother, where the "injury"
to the child was due to some behavior on the part of the
mother.
The use of tort law to hold third parties liable for injuries
inflicted on a fetus does indeed compensate the parents. This
is because in some cases, any injury inflicted on the fetus is necessarily inflicted on the parents as well. 46 The recognition of
fetal rights, however, increases the potential conflicts between
the women and the fetus. By allowing the fetus to have independent rights as a "person" the law focuses upon the individuality of the fetus. And as the individuality of the fetus
becomes increasingly recognized by the law, there is greater
potential and justification for the assertion of fetal rights
against the woman bearing the fetus. 46 Moreover, "decisions
recognizing this rightful goal of compensating the live-born
child may be misinterpreted as granting a fetus broad rights
it does not, and should not possess. "47
41. See also, Ruiz Romero, 681 F. Supp 123 (D. Puerto Rico 1988); where a
woman was beaten by police when she was nine months pregnant, the court held that
the woman's child had no cause of action under 1983. As to these two decisions, the
court notes: "Even assuming arguendo, that Harman and Ruiz Romero were correctly
decided, a presumption we question ...." (emphasis added). Crumpton 947 F. 2d. at 1422.
42. Harman, 525 F. Supp. at 798.
43. Crumpton 947 F.2d at 1424, n.6. In dicta the court also noted: "We need not
decide whether Harman was incorrectly decided." at 1423.
44. Crumpton, 947 F. 2d at 1422.
45. Johnsen, supra note 34, at 603.
46. As fetuses take on more and more characteristics of personhood, women lose
access to their bodies, to the right to privacy espoused under Roe v. Wade. "Because
persons are sovereign, deeming the fetus to be a person, "like me" has seemed the way
to take away women's control over it, hence over themselves." MacKinnon, "Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law," 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1314 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon].
47. Nelson, supra note 35, at 734.
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While Crumpton does not explicitly address the issue offetal
rights, the case raises serious issues about where fetal rights,
children's rights and women's rights converge. Any legal definitions or redefinitions of the applicability of the principles
behind Roe 48 have the potential of eroding the constitutional
protections Roe created: a woman's constitutional right of privacy. While the court in Crumpton clearly noted that whether
a fetus was a person entitled to sue under § 1983 was not dispositive of the case, the issue of fetal rights should not be
overlooked. As one author commented: "It is now the fetus that
dominates the debate."49 In fact, the legal system has reached
a stage where fetuses can be assigned counsel 50 , pregnant
women are prosecuted and jailed for prenatal negligence51 ,
and in some jurisdictions "personhood" is said to begin at conception. 52 Expanding the remedial purposes of § 1983 53 creates a potential fetal/child/maternal conflict whereby the
woman is pitted against her fetus and child. 64
The very decision in Roe56 gave no absolute guarantees of
a woman's right to chose. 58 In particular, a woman's constitutional right to privacy is at stake when she is faced with statecompelled medical treatment for the sake of the fetus. 57 Far
48. Roe 410 U.S. at 113.
49. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND
FEMINISM," 327, 330 (1991) [hereinafter Neffl.
50. See, e.g. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 617 (D.C. App. 1987), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235
(1990) (counsel assigned to fetus to argue necessity of forced cesarean).
51. Cases in which a pregnant women and her fetus are constructed as adversaries
before the state are becoming commonplace. Criminal prosecution of women for pregnancy-related behavior deemed harmful to the fetus, see Paltrow, When Becoming
Pregnant is a Crime, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41 (1990).
52. Mo. Rev. Stat § 1.205.1(1) - .1(2) (1986). The preamble of the Missouri abortion statute reads: [t]he life of each human being begins at conception .... Unborn
children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being."
53. See, e.g. Golden State v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110 (1989). The
court in Crumpton seems to articulate that a child should be compensated for a federally cognizable injuries he or she must bear. That "a contrary rule flies in the face
of the remedial purposes ofsection 1983." Crumpton at 1424.
54. See PETCHESKY, ROSALIND, Abortion and Women's Choice, (2d ed. 1990); also
POLLIT, , "Fetal Rights - A New Assault on Feminism: THE NATION, March 25, 1990,
at 409. Generally, see MacKinnon, supra note 45. As one author noted: " .. .identifying itself as the 'defender of fetal rights', the state reveals its latent suspicion that a
pregnant woman is untrustworthy irresponsible, and an adverse to her fetus." Neff,
supra note 48, at 331.
55. Roe 410 U.S. at 113.
56. The court developed the trimester system whereby the interests of the
woman would be balanced against those of the state, and its interest in protecting the
fetus. Thus at the later time of the pregnancy, particularly at viability, the state is said
to have "compelling" interests, whereby the state can prevent a woman from choosing to have an abortion at that time. Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 158 (1973).
57. Nelson, supra note 35, at 745.
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from protecting women's privacy rights, the limited trimester
analysis established by Roe68 "has permitted the state to exercise increasing control. "69 Indeed, a woman's status under the
Constitution, while in theory superior due to her "personhood," is melting away as the fetus looks more like a "person"
and the courts are more willing to redress harms done to
"infants injured in utero and later born alive .... "60
Under Crumpton, the timing of injury, post birth, alleviates
the necessity to confront the "amorphous and unsettled legal
status of the fetus."61 Unfortunately, it is possible the Court did
not completely avoid the implications of Roe v. Wade. 62 In
particular, the potential cause of action of a child against
hislher mother merely exacerbates the pitting of fetus against
woman and now (possibly) child against mother.
Maternal tort liability63 raises serious dangers as it focuses on the rights of the fetus, rather than the woman, as the
party with the right of recovery in a tort claim.a. In 1980, the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that an expectant mother
would be held to the same standard of conduct as a third party
tortfeasor.66 However, in Stallman v. Younquist 66 , the Illinois
Supreme Court refused to hold a mother liable for prenatal
injuries that her child sustained in a car accident. 67
The Court realized the potential fetal rights issue raised in
Crumpton, yet by overruling the district co~rt's decision, the
58. Roe 410 U.S. at 113.
59. Neff, supra note 48, at 331. • ... the right to privacy cannot be said to be
absolute." Roe 410 U.S. at 172. Under Roe the pregnant woman is not alone and her
rights must be weighed against the competing potential of life.
60. Crumpton 947 F.2d at 1424, n.6.
61. Nelson, supra note 35, at 735.
62. Roe 410 U.S. at 113.
63. For a more comprehensive analysis of maternal tort liability, see Beal, Can
I Sue Mommy? An Analysis ora Woman's Tort Liability To Her Child Born Alille, 21
SAN DIEGO L. REV 325 (1984).
64.ld.
65. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W. 2d 869, 870 (1980). In Grodin, the ·reasonableness" of the mothers conduct in taking tetracycline while pregnant presented a
triable issue of fact. The case represents the first case to shin the focus in a prenatal injury tort claim from the pregnant woman to the fetus.
66. Stallman v. Younquist, 531 N.E. 2d 355, 359 (1988).
67. ld. Criticizing the Grodin court for not realizing the profound implication
of its decision, Stallman emphasized that -[a] legal duty to guarantee the mental and
physical health of another has never before been recognized in law." The court noted
that recognizing the fetus as an individual was a "legal fiction" that would infringe
on women's right to privacy and bodily autonomy. The court concluded that the way
to ensure healthy babies was not tort liability but before-the-fact education of all women
and families about prenatal development.ld. at 361.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 9

832

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:821

Court sidestepped the issue entirely.88 The Court focused on
Crumpton's birth as the point of inquiry and therefore found
him to be a "person" to assert his constitutional claim.
Crumpton may now redress the wrongs he suffered as a result
of the actions committed by the Los Angeles Police Department
who allegedly killed his father. This is justice. What remains
unclear is whether other fetuses born later will be considered
"persons" with the right to redress the "wrongs" committed by
their mothers? Will the state then have a compelling interest
to assert a cause of action against the mother on behalf of the
fetus/child? This is not justice. By not addressing Roe v
Wade 69 and failing to re-affirm the principle that a fetus is not
a person, the Court has left the door open to provide more rights
to fetuses, at the expense of women's rights.
Feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon recently commented on the implications of fetus as "person".70 The overall
message is strikingly poignant and applicable as one attempts
to predict the implications of Crumpton v. Gates for women:
N ow place the legal status of the fetus
against the backdrop of women's tenuous
to nonexistent equality. Women have not
been considered "persons" by the law for
very long; the law of persons arguably does
not recognize the requisites of female personhood yet. Separate fetal status of any
sort, in a male-dominated system in which
women have been controlled through the
control of their procreative capacity, risks
further entrenchment of women's inequality. If the fetus were deemed a person, it may
well have more rights than women do, especially since fetal rights would be asserted
most often by men in traditionally male
institutions of authority... Fetal rights as
such are thus in direct tension with sex
equality rights. 71

Carol Beth Barnett*
68. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1422.
69. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.

70. MacKinnon, supra note 45, at 1315.
71. [d.

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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CRIMINAL LAW
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

1.

Evidence of the Battered Woman Syndrome is relevant to support a battered woman's claim of selfdefense.

People v. Day, No. F014113 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). In
People v. Day, the court held that evidence of the Battered
Woman Syndrome! was relevant on the issue of whether Day
honestly believed she needed to use deadly force in self- defense;
it was also relevant to explain a behavior pattern that might otherwise appear unreasonable to the average person. 2
FACTS
PROSECUTION CASE

The prosecution presented the following facts at trial. On
the night of June 10, 1988, appellant, Valoree Jean Day, stabbed
Steve Brown, the man with whom she lived. At approximately
11 p.m. that night, a neighbor in the adjacent apartment, Jan
Fernandez, overheard an argument between Day and Brown.
Fernandez called the building's security twice that night, to
request that they intervene in the fight next door. Russell
Holt, another neighbor, heard the front door of the DaylBrown
apartment slam shut, as Brown yelled, "You don't have to lock
me out. I have a key of my own, bitch."3 Holt then heard
Brown's truck leave, and return five to ten minutes later.
Just before 1 a.m. on June 11, 1988, Tuolumne County
Deputy Sheriff Antone and Groveland Constable Jarratt
arrived at Day's apartment. The front door was open, the
master bedroom was locked from the inside and was missing
the exterior knob, a chair was pushed over, and no one was in
the apartment. The officers searched outside the apartment,
and found Brown lying face-down with several stab wounds, at
the west corner of the complex.
1. Hereinafter referred to a8 BWS.
2. People v. Day, No. F014113 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992).
3. 1d. at 195.
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Brown died early that morning; the cause of death was
stab wounds to his chest. He had four frontal wounds: a deep
wound in his chest, a superficial wound, and two slices. He had
a deep stab wound to his back, and superficial cuts on his fingers, hips and forehead.
At about the same time that Brown was found, Day
appeared at the door of her friend's, Lynn Olson. Day told Olson
that she stabbed Brown after he attacked her with a knife.
Olson called the home of Constable Jarratt, who arrived shortly thereafter and took Day into custody.
In jail, Day was examined by a nurse and the following
injuries were discovered: bruises to Day's right upper arm,
inner arm, forearm, and outside of the arm. The knuckles of
both Day's hands were red and swollen, and she had a bruise
and abrasion on her right knee. Day had a shallow abrasion
on her right elbow. During the examination, Day was told that
Brown had died, and she began to cry and hyperventilate; the
nurse gave Day librium to calm her.
Five days later, Day was examined in jail by a doctor. He
found additional injuries including bruises on Day's chest,
and on the triceps of her right arm. Day's left eardrum was perforated, she had a contusion on her right kneecap and a contusion and abrasion on her right shinbone. There was also
bruising on her rear hip.
DEFENSE CASE

Day testified at trial as to her version of the fight and
stabbing on June 10, 1988, and revealed a perspective which
differed significantly from that of the prosecution. In order to
more fully understand the apparent discrepancies, it is helpful to first examine the history of Day's relationship with
Brown.

1.

History

At trial, Day testified that Brown began to beat her early
in their relationship. Day attributed the beatings to Brown's
drinking, and felt that if she stayed with him, and helped
him, things would get better. However, over time, the frequency
and severity of the beatings increased.
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Before they moved in together, Brown tried to strangle
Day, and in 1987 he tried to run her over with his car. Brown
frequently went to bars, drank, and came home angry. Day
would lock herself in the bedroom to escape Brown's violence.
One day in the fall of 1987 Day came home without her
keys. Brown had been drinking and would not let her in.
When Day knocked at the back door, Brown opened it and
began to punch her. Brown then sat on top of Day, pinned her
arms to the ground, and banged her head against the deck. Day
screamed to her neighbor for help, and eventually a security
officer came and took Day to a friend's house.
The ongoing abuse and violence notwithstanding, Day
never filed a formal complaint against Brown. She felt that the
officers always sided with Brown, and additionally, she hoped
that she and Brown could resolve their problems on their own.
During the time that Day and Brown lived together, neighbors and friends saw injuries on Day including facial bruises,
black eyes, swollen lips, and red marks and bruises on her body.
On occasion, Day fought back,' and in one instance, a
friend saw a bite mark on Brown's cheek.

2.

Incident

Day testified that on the night of June 10, 1988, Brown went
out fot: the evening. Day was in bed around 11 p.m. when she
heard the downstairs door slam and the sound of a beer can
opening. Brown then came upstairs and Day heard him trying
to unlock the bedroom door. Brown said, "I'm going to kill you,"6
and Day screamed for help. Day heard what she thought was
a stabbing sound at the door, and then a knife blade penetrated
through the door.
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on June 11, Brown left the
house, saying as he left, "Don't try and lock me out, I have
keys."6 Day locked the front door, and grabbed a knife to protect herself. She saw cigarettes on the counter, and, fearful that
4. The record indicates only one such specific instance, when Day hit Brown on
the head with a tennis racquet.
5. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 196 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992).
6. [d.
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Brown might use them to set the house on fire, took them
upstairs and wet them. Day then locked herself in the master
bedroom.
When Brown returned he said, "I'm going to kill you,
Valoree. I've had it with yoU."7 Day told him to leave, and that
she had a knife to protect herself. Brown broke open the
master bedroom door, and Day ran into the bathroom. After a
few minutes, Brown left the bedroom.
Day then went into the guest bedroom and put a chair
against the door. Brown returned, and pounded on the guest
bedroom door. Again, Day screamed to her neighbors for help.
Brown opened the door and rushed Day with a knife. They fell
to the floor. Brown tried to stab Day but missed. "The next
thing [Day] knew, Brown was hurt."8
Day did not realize the gravity of Brown's injuries, and was
afraid he would return to renew the attack. She quickly left
the apartment, and when she realized she still had the knife
in her hand, she dropped it. Day made sure Brown was not
near her car, and drove to Lynn Olson's house.
COURT'S ANALYSIS
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Day was tried by a jury, and convicted of involuntary
manslaughter, and assault with a deadly weapon. After her
conviction, Day obtained new counsel, and moved for a new
trial. Day argued that her assistance of counsel was ineffective
because her attorney made no effort to investigate or present
evidence of the BWS. The trial court agreed that Day's counsel was deficient, but concluded that Day had not been prejudiced, and denied her motion for a new trial.
Day argued that the trial court erred in finding no prejudice. She claimed that evidence of the BWS was admissible to
prove the objective reasonableness of her use of deadly force in
self-defense, and to rehabilitate her in light of the prosecution's
assertion that her conduct, both before and after the incident,
was not consistent with having acted in self-defense.
7.Id.
8. Id. at 196·97. The facts do not clearly indicate how Brown received the fatal
wounds.
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EXTRALEGAL FACTORS

In support of her motion for a new trial, Day filed several
affidavits which the appellate court used to analyze Day's
claims of error.
Day's trial counsel filed an affidavit and admitted that he
knew nothing about BWS, and that he never considered
researching or presenting evidence on Day's behalf regarding
BWS. He further acknowledged that if he were to try the
case again, he would present such evidence.
M. Gerald Schwartzbach, a legal expert witness, submitted
an affidavit which stated that in 1981 he used the expert witness testimony of psychologist Dr. Lenore E. Walkers to obtain
an acquittal for his client charged with homicide on the grounds
of self-defense. 10
Dr. Lee H. Bowker,l1 an authority on BWS, submitted an
affidavit in which he concluded, based on an in-depth interview
with Day, and on materials presented by Day's attorney, that
Day suffered from BWS. Although Day occasionally defended
herself against Brown's attacks, she was no less a battered
woman. Dr. Bowker stated that, "[t]wo of the personal strategies commonly employed by battered women are flight and
active self-defense, more commonly known as counter-violence."12
Pat Cervelli, a counselor with extensive experience in the
domestic violence field, also filed an affidavit in which she concluded that Day suffered from the BWS. Ms. Cervelli stated
that it is common for a battered woman to forget and to minimize the severity of the beatings she receives, which enables
her to stay in a very dangerous situation. Ms. Cervelli listed
some of the reasons a woman stays in a battering relationship,
which include loving the batterer, and hoping or believing the
violence will end. IS Additionally, a battered woman typically
feels her batterer is far more powerful and strong than he
9. Dr. Lenore E. Walker is an authority on BWS. Two of her books include:
(1979); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED

LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).

10. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 197 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992).
11. Dr. Lee H. Bowker is a psychologist and Dean of Behavioral and Social
Sciences at Humboldt State University.
12. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 197 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992).
13. 1d.
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actually is, which reinforces her sense of helplessness and
futility. Ms. Cervelli explained that a "perception of a lack of
protection by law enforcement (or by anyone else) is part of the
BWS. Attempts to stop the violence usually fail, because the
battered woman has a belief that it is useless, a previous
experience with law enforcement officials that was
unsupportive, fear of retaliation by the batterer, and lastly, fear
ofloss of the relationship. "14 Finally, although she may have
difficulty leaving the relationship, or seeking outside help, a
battered woman often does fight back. Ms. Cervelli explained
that "what defines a woman as being 'battered' is the fact
that she is the victim of violence perpetrated by her partner,
and that she remains in the relationship after repeated violent
incidents. She if [sic] often angry and often hits back. "16
OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS OR SUBJECTIVE HONESTY

The court first assessed Day's claim that evidence of the
BWS was admissible to prove the objective reasonableness of
her use of deadly force l6 in self defense. The court cited with
approval People v. Aris 17 which held that "expert testimony
about a defendant's state of mind is not relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant's self-defense. "18 However, the
Aris court concluded that evidence ofBWS is relevant to prove
that the defendant honestly believed that deadly force was necessary to defend herself. 19 Similarly, the court in Day held
that evidence of the BWS was relevant to prove Day's honest
belief that she had to use deadly force to defend herself,20
although it was not relevant to show that she acted as would
a reasonable person in similar circumstances. 21
14. 1d.
15. 1d. at 198, quoting Gelles, Straus, 1987.
16. Justifiable homicide, as defined by the California Penal Code, requires that
the person exercising self-defense have a "reasonable ground to apprehend a design
to do ... great bodily injury, and ... must really and in good faith have endeavored to
decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed .... • Cal. Penal Code
§ 197 (3) (West 1988). Courts have interpreted this standard as requiring a double
showing: first, the defendant must actually have been in fear of his or her life, or of
serious bodily injury; and second, the conduct of the other party must have been such
as to produce that state of mind in a reasonable person. People v. Sonier, 113 Cal. App.
2d 277, 278, 248 P.2d 155, 156 (1952).
17. People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989).
18. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 198 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992), citing Aris, 215
Cal. App. 3d at 1196, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
19. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 198 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6,1992), citingAris, 215
Cal. App 3d at 1199, 264 Cal Rptr. at 181.
20. 1d. at 200.
21. 1d. at 198.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/9

18

Barnett et al.: California Law Survey

1992]

SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW

839

REHABILITATION OF WITNESS CREDIBILITY

Day's second claim was that evidence of the BWS was
admissible to show that her conduct was consistent with selfdefense. The court held that evidence of the BWS was
admissible for this purpose, and cited as authority, People v.
McAlpin. 22
In McAlpin, the Supreme Court held that expert testimony
on the common reactions of child molestation victims "is admissible to rehabilitate such witness's credibility when the defendant suggests that the child's conduct after the incident...is
inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation."23
The McAlpin court analogized expert testimony on "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome" to expert testimony on
rape trauma syndromeu previously held admissible in People
v. Bledsoe. 26 The McAlpin court explained that this expert testimony is necessary "to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the
emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly selfimpeaching behavior. "26
The court in Day concluded that the reasoning of McAlpin 21
applied equally to the battered woman context. Evidence of
the BWS would have helped to counter the prosecutor's challenge to Day's credibility, and to dispel many of the commonly held misconceptions about battered women which the
prosecutor exploited, and which defense counsel failed to
rebut.
22. People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 812 P.2d 563, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1991).
23. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6,1992), citing McAlpin,
53 Cal. 3d at 1300, 812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
24. 53 Cal. 3d at 1300, 812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
25. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
In Bledsoe, the court held that expert testimony was inadmissible to prove that the
complaining witness in a rape case had in fact been raped. 36 Cal. 3d at 251,681
P.2d at 301,203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. However, the court distinguished expert testi·
mony presented in order to rehabilitate the complaining witness after the defendant
had impeached her credibility by suggesting that her conduct after the incident was
inconsistent with having been raped. The court reasoned that expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome was useful to disabuse the jury of widely held misconceptions
about rape and rape victims, so that it could evaluate the evidence free of the con·
straints of popular myths. 36 Cal. 3d at 247·48, 681 P.2d at 298,203 Cal. Rptr. at
457.
26. 53 Cal. 3d at 1301,812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
27. [d.
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First, the prosecutor at trial argued that Day and Brown
were engaged in "mutual combat," and even defense counsel
characterized their relationship as one of "mutual combat." The
appellate court reasoned that expert testimony would have "disabused the jury of the notion that because a woman strikes back
at her batterer, she is engaging in "mutual combat. "38 The court
cited Commonwealth v. Stonehouse 29 and Dr. Bowker's affidavit30 as support for the proposition that it is not uncommon
for a battered woman to resort to counter-violence. 31 The
Stonehouse court reasoned that a woman who attempts to
defend herself against her batterer is no less a battered woman
"in that her attempts do not stop the repeated episodes of
physical and emotional abuse. "32
Second, the prosecutor at trial argued that if Day were
being beaten by Brown, she could have left him. Due to defense
counsel's ignorance of the BWS, he presented no evidence to
counter this myth, nor did he present any argument to explain
why Day did not leave Brown. The appellate court cited State
v. Hodges 33 for the proposition that "expert testimony on the
[BWS] would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception
that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any
time."34
Finally, the prosecutor argued that Day's flight after stabbing Brown evidenced a consciousness of guilt. Defense counsel failed to offer any alternative explanation for Day's flight.
Referring to Day's motion for a new trial,36 the appellate court
stated that evidence of the BWS would have explained that
some women do not realize they are safe even after the abuser is dead or injured, and that they take further protective measures against the retaliation they expect to follow an aggressive
attack.
The appellate court concluded that Day was prejudiced by
counsel's failure to present evidence of the BWS, because there
28. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992).
29. Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 555 A.2d 772 (1989).
30. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 197 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992).
31. [d. at 199, citIng Stonehouse 555 A. 2d at 784.
32. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992), citing
Stonehouse, 555 A. 2d at 784, n.10.
33. State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 239 Kan. 63 (1986), disapproved on other
grounds in State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579, 243 Kan. 639 (1988).
34. Hodges, 716 P.2d at 579.
35. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992).
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was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. "38 Counsel's lack of knowledge of the BWS left him
unable to counter the prosecutor's claim that Day's conduct was
inconsistent with self-defense, and it left him equally unable
to counter the myths about battered women upon which the
prosecutor built his case.
CONCLUSION
Courts are now beginning to recognize the BWS as a legitimate theory ofself-defense. 37 Implicit in this recognition is an
acknowledgement that the social and psychological factors
that comprise the BWS are important to legal analysis. When
the BWS is applied to the facts of a given case, what was formerly a more traditional rights-based analysis moves away
from rigidly defined rules and becomes necessarily more contextual. The court in Day compared different characteristics
of the prototypical battered woman, as defined by the BWS,
with Day's specific conduct both preceding and following the
stabbing of Brown. This analysis led the court to conclude that
Day's actions were consistent with those of a battered woman,
and that Day did honestly believe that she needed to use deadly force to defend herself. This case clearly demonstrates the
importance of teaching practitioners to analyze the legal and
factual issues of any case, in light of relevant psychological and
sociological factors. To fail to do so is to fail to adequately represent a client.

Heather Allyson Elrick*

36. [d. at 200, citing In re Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 1257, 774 P.2d 164, 169,259
Cal. Rptr. 491, 496 (1989).
37. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 195 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6,1992); State v. Kelly,
97 N.J. 178,478 A.2d 364 (1984).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
SEX DISCRIMINATION

1.

A policy of excluding women from employment because
they are fertile is unlawful discrimination.

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1990), cert.
denied. In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission, the California Court of Appeal struck
down the Fetal Protection Program (FPP) instituted by Johnson
Controls and exposed it as a clear case of wrongful discrimination. The Court noted that Johnson Controls' policy did not
seek to educate women about the risks oflead exposure to fetuses or remove those risks, but rather sought to remove from
women "the opportunity to make any choices in the matter at all."1
The Court held the FPP to be unlawful discrimination based on
sex, as it prevented fertile women from engaging in specific
areas of employment.
Ms. Foster, "a young, physically able woman seeking and
needing employment"2, applied for ajob at Globe Battery, a division of Johnson Controls. Ms. Foster was unaware that the job
she sought was subject to female exclusion. Johnson Controls'
FPP prevented women of child bearing capacity from working
in areas of the battery plant that were exposed to high levels
of lead. The FPP required documentation of infertility as a prerequisite to employment only for women. 3
After having been denied the job because of her refusal to
produce medical evidence of infertility, Ms. Foster filed a complaint with the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
(Commission). The Commission investigated her complaint
and found that "[Johnson Controls'] hiring practices were
1. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n. 218 Cal. App.
3d 517,551,267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 178 (1990).
2. [d. at 525. 267 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
3. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 533, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 166. The
Company's policy claims only to be directed at women of child bearing capacity. but
it is actually directed at "all women except those whose inability to bear children is
medically documented.· [d. (emphasis added).
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discriminatory on the basis of sex [and] that the FPP was not
based upon a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).'"
The Commission ordered Johnson Controls to hire Ms. Foster
and to discontinue its FPP.6
The subject of fetal protection programs is neither of first
impression for the courts nor for Johnson Controls. The United
Auto Workers sued Johnson Controls on a similar complaint
which led to a finding of unlawful discrimination by the United
States Supreme Court: "sex-specific fetal protection policies
[are] unlawful in light of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964], as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act."6 In
this case, the California Court of Appeal relied on the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Act) as its authority.7 The Act
provides that employment discrimination based on sex is
unlawful "unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification."8 "The BFOQ defense ... has two components: First, the
employer must demonstrate that the occupational qualification
is 'reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the] particular business'. Secondly, the employer must show that the
categorical exclusion based on protected class characteristic is
. t'fi
JUs
I Ie d .... "9
The availability of the BFOQ defense "was in fact meant to
be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination based on sex."tO The applicability of the BFOQ
is dependent on women's ability to perform the job in question:
4. Id. at 526, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
5.ld.
6. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), prohibits employment discrimination based
on race, sex, religion or national origin. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
is an llmendment to Title VII that explicitly holds discrimination based on pregnancy or the ability to become pregnant in violation of Title VII.
7. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 532, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The court
applied the standards of the Fair Employment and Housing Act used by the
Commission in reviewing the Commission's finding of overt discrimination. Id. at 530,
267 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The Commission, in construing the California statute, is neither bound to consider nor follow Federal law. Id. at 540, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
8. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980).
9. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 540, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (citing
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
10. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). This was the first case to
construe the BFOQ. The case involved a woman seeking employment as a counselor
in a maximum-security male prison in Alabama. The Court found that "[a] woman's
relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary could be directly reduced by her womanhood." Id. at 335. As a result of the
relationship between the ability to perform the job and the gender of the applicant,
the court found this case to fall within the narrow exception of the BFOQ.
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"the BFOQ exception will not justify the exclusion of all women
from employment unless the employer shows that a male sexual characteristic is 'crucial to the successful performance of
the job' involved."11 Based on the information presented, the
Court stated that "the foregoing evidence and evidentiary
paucity supports the factual conclusion that the exclusion of fertile women only from the battery factory workplace is a facial,
blatant, overt gender-based job discrimination ... unless warranted by a BFOQ."12
The Court then concluded that "the facts do not satisfy
the BFOQ test. "13 There was "no evidence that fertile women
cannot efficiently perform jobs involving contact with lead at
the [Johnson Controls] facility."14 In addition, the risk of fetal
harm did not justify the program as "there was no evidence of
any harm to a single child. "16 Johnson Controls did not demonstrate acceptable reasons for excluding fertile women from
battery production, therefore, it was unable to satisfy the
BFOQ exception.
Johnson Controls also raised another defense to employment discrimination based on sex called the Business Necessity
Defense (BND). The BND arises under the "'disparate impact'
theory in which an employer institutes a policy that appears
neutral on its face but discriminates in effect against certain
employees on the basis of their race, sex, or religion. "16 The
BND cannot be used in this case, as it is "concerned with
facially neutral rules, standards and criteria, rather than
with class-based exclusion."17 The policy applied in this case
11. Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the
Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798, n.3 (1981)(citing Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971». In Rosenfeld, a woman sought
the position of agent·telegrapher at a railroad company. The Court held that there
was no basis for the BFOQ, as the company did not contend that "the sexual
characteristics of the employee are crucial to the job." Id. Strenuous physical demands
of a job are not enough to prevent women from employment: "the company attempts
to raise a commonly accepted characterization of women as the 'weaker sex' to the level
of a BFOQ." Id. Rosenfeld emphasizes the extremely high standard of the BFOQ.
12. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 539, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
13. Id. at 542,267 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
14. Id. The Court further emphasized this point by stating that the ·'essence' of
the business operation - making automotive batteries - would not be undermined".
Id.
15. Id.
16. Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A Statutory Proposal in the Wake of
International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1110, 1114
(1990).
17. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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was aimed directly at women, hence it was not facially neutral;
therefore, the BND was not available.
In analyzing the two defenses used by Johnson Controls in
support of its fetal protection program, the Court found deficiencies and inconsistencies. The Court first examined the
standards for control oflead exposure in a work environment
adopted by the Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). Those standards neither differentiate between safe levels for men and women, nor exclude fertile
women from jobs including lead exposure!S Instead, OSHA
warns that both men and women who plan to have children
should keep their lead levels below a specified level. 19
Consequently, divergent policies for men and women in terms
of fetal protection is not justified.20 By ignoring the proven
impact of health risks to men and their future offspring,
Johnson Controls' supposed interest in fetal protection is
exposed as sex discrimination.
Johnson Controls' supposed concern for fetal protection
was further weakened by the lack of scientific evidence established by Johnson Controls to support their claim of fetal danger: "The company's expert Dr. Culver admitted there were no
recent studies that showed birth defects from lead exposure of
a mother."21 Johnson Controls neither tracked the pregnancies
nor documented effects on the infants of those workers who did
become pregnant while exposed to high lead levels at the
plant. 22 Indeed, "[t]he company's experts were unable to identify or quantify the harm the FPP was supposed to remedy."23
Johnson Controls' argument of genuine concern for the fetus,
therefore, was severely undermined by this "total lack of
18. [d. at 528, 267 Cal. Rptr. at.162.
19. [d. The Court cites the Commission's finding number 12: the Federal OSHA
lead standard states that "both males and females exposed to lead who wish to plan

pregnancies should keep their lead levels below 30ug/100ml because of possible
adverse effects to the fetus." [d. It is therefore clear that males are also affected by
high levels of lead.
20. [d. at 536, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
21. [d. at 537,267 Cal. Rptr. at 168. Based on the expert testimony during the
trial, the Court found that the "Company's policy is based on speculation (extrapo.
lations) about the fetus and lead exposure, assumptions that lack sound scientific sup·
port." Dr. Fishburn, one of the Company's expert witnesses, stated that he had seen
thousands of battery workers and could only think of one case in which a fetus suffered from lead exposure. Even in this sole case, however, there was no follow-up to
determine whether the effect (hyperactivity of the child) was permanent. [d.
22. [d. at 529, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
23. [d. at 537, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
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evidence of harm to any fetus in [Johnson Controls']
experience. "24
Johnson Controls attempted to cloak discrimination against
women in the supposed "objective differences" between men and
women 26 ; in particular, the ability to become pregnant. The
Court, in its dicta, found that Johnson Controls based its
arguments on "unfounded assumptions about women"26 including: that all women are sexually active, that those who are, are
involved with fertile men, that those who are involved with fertile men cannot be trusted to use birth control, and that women
are incapable of making decisions regarding an unexpected
pregnancy in a hazardous worksite. 27 The Court then condemned the overarching assumption which seems to have
fueled the FPP, and Johnson Controls' discrimination against
women: "[Johnson Controls'] policy is predicated upon the
presumption that the employer is better suited to safeguard the
interest of a woman's future offspring, should there be an
unexpected pregnancy, than is the woman herself. "26 The
Court recognized the inherent contradictions found within
Johnson Controls' FPP, and confronted the hidden agenda of
this policy: "... [Johnson Controls] may not effectuate their
goals ... at the expense of a woman's ability to obtain work for
which she is otherwise qualified. "29
It has been noted that "historically, an effective means for
employers, legislatures, and courts to limit the equal employment opportunities of women was to restrict their employment out of a professed concern for the health of women and
their offspring. "30 At first glance, the FPP appears only to be
another example of a paternalistic policy that dictates what is
'best' for women and their offspring. In actuality, Johnson
Controls is also attempting to prevent women from engaging
in certain types of employment. It is not uncommon for fetal
protection programs to predominate in traditionally male
domains: "The scope of [fetal protection] policies is influenced
by the sexual composition of the work force. When the work
24. 1d. at 538, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
25. 1d. at 551,267 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
26. 1d. at 550,267 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
27.1d.
28. 1d. at 551,267 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
29. 1d. at 552, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
30. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (llth Cir. 1984).
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force is predominantly male, some employers exclude all fertile women from hazardous jobs. When the work force is predominantly female, some employers exclude only pregnant
women from hazardous jobs."31 The effort to restrict women's
employment opportunities at Johnson Controls is evidenced by
the fact that "both at the time of [Ms. Foster's] application and
at the time of hearing, no women were employed [in the position Ms. Foster sought] at [Johnson Controls'] Fullerton
plant. "32 The Court was not deceived by the supposed altruism
of the FPP, but instead saw through to Johnson Controls' ulterior motive of employment discrimination.
By failing to monitor the children born of women who
worked in the plant during and prior to pregnancy, and failing
to conduct adequate research on the subject in general, Johnson
Controls was not advocating better care for a woman's fetus,
but rather was instituting a policy which denied women fair
employment and opportunities. An honest Fetal Protection
Program, concerned about protecting workers and their children, would provide a safe work environment and would ensure
the future good health of the offspring of both male and female
employees.
Both the Court's ruling and its powerful, reprimanding dicta
send a clear message to California employers seeking to implement
an FPP. This case emphasizes the importance of recognizing
women's ability to make intelligent, personal choices regarding
their health and the health of their potential offspring, and the
dange17 of placing that power in others' hands. The decision in
Johnson Controls also sends a strong message to employers that
society and the courts will not accept disguised excuses for discrimination. This case is a critical step in the eradication of
employment discrimination in all its forms.

Julie Hammel Brook*

31. Becker, From Muller II. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1219, 1239 (1986).
32. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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Sexual harassment and discrimination claims in
employment may be brought under both the Fair
Employment and Housing Act and the common law
either sequentially or simultaneously.

Raja v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130,
801 P.2d 373 (1990). In Raja v. Kliger, the California Supreme
Court held that a victim of sexual harassment and discrimination in employment need not file a statutory claim under the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) before filing a
common law claim in civil court.1 The Court also held that "sex
discrimination in employment may support a claim of tortious discharge."2
I.

FACTS

Plaintiffs, Emma Rojo and Teresa Maloney, were both
employed by the defendant, Dr. Erwin Kliger, as assistants.
Both women were "subjected by defendant to sexually harassing remarks and demands for sexual favors which ultimately
forced them to leave their employment."3
Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney filed a complaint against Dr.
Kliger for violations of FEHA and for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. At the trial court, Dr. Kliger successfully
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the "FEHA
constituted plaintiffs' exclusive remedy and that plaintiffs
had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under
the act.'" Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney had opposed the motion
by arguing that the FEHA "does not sup'plant other state law
remedies" and "pursuit of the administrative remedy is not a
condition precedent to judicial relief."6 In addition to
1. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 70, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132, 801 P.2d 373, 375
(1990). For a discussion of tort causes of action available to victims of sexual harassment, see Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort
Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 879 (1980).
2. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 70, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 801 P.2d at 375.
3. Id. at 71, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 801 P.2d at 375. The specific allegations included, among others: touching Ms. Rojo's breasts and french-kissing her; forcibly grabbing Ms. Maloney in the groin and forcing her to feel the defendant's groin. Id.
4.Id.
5. Id.
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responding to the defendant's motion, the plaintiffs also requested leave to amend their complaint in order to assert additional causes of action, including assault and battery and tortious
discharge in contravention of public policy.8 The Court of
Appeal reversed the trial court's decision and held that the
plaintiffs could seek state common law remedies without first
exhausting remedies under FEHA. The Court of Appeal also
ruled that "plaintiffs' allegations of sexual harassment and
discrimination could support a claim of tortious discharge in contravention of public policy."7 The California Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal.
II. FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT (FEHA)
The FEHA, created in 1980 by the merging of the
California Fair Employment Practices Act with the Rumford
Fair Housing Act, "establishes that freedom from job discrimination on specified grounds, including sex, is a civil
right ... such discrimination is against public policy and an
unlawful employment practice."8 The FEHA consists of two
administrative bodies, one that investigates and prosecutes
and the other that hears and decides claims. 9 The complaint
process of the FEHA is inhibiting to some employees because
they must contact one of only eleven offices in California, "be
interviewed by a non-lawyer who decides whether the employee appears to have a valid claim ... [and] be able to prove the
discrimination case .... "10 The potential difficulty of this process explains why some women would choose to pursue judicial remedies instead.
6. Id.
7.Id.
8. Id. at 72, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133,801 P.2d at 376 (citing Commodore Home Sys.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 213,185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 271, 649 P.2d 912, 913
(1982). The broad goal of the FEHA, set out in the California Government Code §
12920, is to protect the right and opportunity for all to "seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination .... • CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (Deering 1982).
9. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal 3d. at 72, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133, 801 P.2d at 376. The
Department receives complaints and investigates them. If a claim is deemed valid,
the Department attempts to resolve the matter. If private resolution is ineffective
or inappropriate, the Department may issue an accusation and act as prosecutor before
the Commission which hears the claim. If either no accusation is issued within 150
days of filing the complaint, or the Department decides not to prosecute, the
Department must issue a "right to sue· letter which allows a complainant to bring a
civil suit. Id. For further discussion of this process, See Oppenheimer, Employment
Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge: Does the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act Displace Common Law Remedies? 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 145,155-58 (1989).
10. Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 156-57.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

29

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 9

850

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:821

Under FEHA, sexual harassment is an unlawful employment practice separate from discrimination, however, "the
regulations and Commission decisions recognize that sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination in employment. "11
Specifically, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
has stated that sexual harassment "deprives its victim of a discrimination-free work environment ... when the harassment
creates an intimidating, oppressive, hostile or offensive work
environment .... "12 Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney were clearly
subjected to such an environment. As a result of the extreme
nature of the harassment that they endured, Ms. Rojo and Ms.
Maloney were victims of sex discrimination.
III. THE FEHA DOES NOT PREEMPT OR PRECLUDE
OTHER STATE LAW CLAIMS RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION.
The Court found that the FEHA was not intended to preempt other state laws relating to employment discrimination,
but rather, the Legislature intended to "amplify, not abrogate, an employee's common law remedies for injuries relating
to employment discrimination. "13 The Court found that both the
statutory language and its prior decisions establish that the
FEHA was intended to supplement other state law remedies,
and that the defendant's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. I. The FEHA expressly states that "nothing contained
in this part shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of
the Civil Rights Law or any other law of this state relating to
discrimination [based on sex]. "16 The Court also pointed to case
law in which it has been held that "both administrative and
judicial remedies are available to victims of employment discrimination. "16 The FEHA has widened the scope of actions a
11. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 73, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133·34, SOl P.2d at 376-77.
12.Id.
13. Id. at 75, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135, SOl P.2d at 37S.
14. Id.
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12993(a) (Deering 19S2). In addition, the court found that
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12993(c), which states that the FEHA is intended to "occupy the
field" of regulation of employment discrimination, indicates only an intention to preempt local laws, but not to displace state laws. Rojo u. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 7S, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 137, SOl P.2d at 3S0.
16. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 74, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135, SOl P.2d at 37S. As
an example of caselaw, the Court cites Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 (19S7). This case held that
although punitive damages may not be awarded under the FEHA, a complainant can
seek punitive damages in a separate civil action alleging tort causes of action either
with or without a FEHA claim. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/9

30

Barnett et al.: California Law Survey

1992]

SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW

851

victim of sexual discrimination and harassment in employment
may pursue, not contracted it as the defendant asserts.
IV. EXHAUSTION OF FEHA ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO PURSUIT OF OTHER
REMEDIES.
The Court emphasized a distinction between pursuing a
civil suit based on a statutory claim and a civil suit based on
a common law claim. Agreeing in part with Dr. Kliger's motion,
the Court found that "exhaustion of the FEHA administrative
remedy is a precondition to bringing a civil suit on a statutory cause of action."17 However, the Court found that there is
no exhaustion requirement before filing "a civil action for
damages alleging non-statutory causes of action."18
In making this distinction, the court examined the goals of
the exhaustion requirement and found that the interests
served by the requirement do not apply in this case. Ie The interests of the exhaustion requirement are not served in the
employment discrimination context because "these are not
cases having such a paramount need for specialized agency factfinding expertise .... "2o Unlike other issues in which an administrative agency has particular expertise, FEHA does not have
a special ability to administer and regulate the employeremployee relationship and to assess and prevent discrimination
and related wrongs in the workplace; 21 In addition, the factual issues in an employment discrimination case are neither
too complex nor too technical for the judicial system to handle. 22
V. SEXUAL HARASSMENT MAY GIVE RISE TO A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY.
Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney assert that both their refusal to
tolerate the sexual harassment and their failure to acquiesce
in the sexual demands of their employer resulted in their
17. [d. at 83, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 141, 801 P.2d at 384 (original emphasis).
18. [d. at 88, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144, 801 P.2d at 387.
19. [d. at 86,276 Cal. Rptr. at 143, 801 P.2d at 386. The interests served by the

exhaustion requirement include: "bolstering administrative autonomy; permitting the
agency to resolve factual issues, apply its expertise and exercise statutorily delegated
remedies; mitigating damages; and promoting judicial economy.- [d.
20. Id. at 88,276 Cal. Rptr. at 144, 801 P.2d at 387.
21. [d.
22. [d.
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wrongful discharges. 2S Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney claim that
under the California Constitution there is "a fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in the workplace .... "24 The
Court denied defendant's contention that the constitutional provision applies only to state action and found instead that it covers private employers as well.26 The Court then explained that in
order to find a violation of public policy, "the policy must be
'fundamental' and 'public' in nature. "26 Public policy has been further defined as a policy that "inures to the benefit of the public
at large rather than to a particular employer or employee."27
The Court found that the policy against sex discrimination and
sexual harassment is both public and fundamental: "so long as
it exists, we are all demeaned. "26 The Court held that Ms. Rojo and
Ms. Maloney could base a claim of tortious discharge in contravention of public policy on sex discrimination in employment. 29
VI.

CONCLUSION

With this decision, the California Supreme Court has supported and underscored the breadth of forums and remedies
available to victims of sexual harassment and discrimination
in employment. Women subjected to sexual harassment can
seek common law remedies without having to first exhaust
their remedies under FEHA; the FEHA remedies are in addition to, not instead of, other common law remedies. This significant decision has empowered the victims of sexual
harassment and discrimination in employment. Hopefully,
"[i]nvolvement of the legal system in the [sexual harassment
problem] is one step towards the elimination of sexual harassment. "30 When forcibly subjected to harassment and discrimination, Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney were denied the freedom of
choice; now, the choice of forum and remedy is all theirs.
Julie Hammel Brook*
23. [d. at 89, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 801 P.2d at 388. Ms. Maloney was discharged
and Ms. Rojo was constructively discharged. [d.
24. [d. The California Constitution in Article I, section 8, provides that: "A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or natural or ethnic origin.- CAL.
CONST.

art. I, § 8.

25. [d.

26. [d. (citing Foley v.lnteractive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
765 P.2d 373 (1988».
27. [d.

28. [d.
29. [d. at 71, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 801 P.2d at 375.

30. Note, supra note 1, at 928.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1.

Department store violated job applicant's right to privacy because it failed to demonstrate a compelling
interest in administering personality test.

Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 654, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 77 (1991). In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp.l, the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin Target Stores from their practice of
administering a psychological screening test to job applicants
for security officer positions2 • In reversing the trial court's
denial of injunctive relief, the California Court of Appeal,
First District held that the California Constitution confers
an inalienable right to privacy on job applicants and employees alike3 • It further held that an employer must demonstrate
a compelling interest in order to overcome the employee's or
applicant's right to privacy'. More significantly for the purposes
of this note, the Soroka court explicitly held that the California
Labor Code prohibits both private and public employers from
discriminating against job applicants and employees on the
basis of sexual orientation6 •
I.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs, in their prayer for injunctive relief, contended that Target violated their constitutional and statutory right to privacy when it forced them to respond to questions
regarding religious attitudes and sexual orientation as a prerequisite to job considerations. The trial court denied the
motion for the preliminary injunction because it did not find
the questions regarding religious attitudes and sexual orientation to be unjustifiably intrusive7• Thus, the court was not
persuaded that the plaintiffs would prevail at a trial on the
merits of either their constitutional or statutory claims 8 , a
necessary prerequisite for injunctive relief. The Court of
1. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 654, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (1991).
2. Id. at 658, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
3. Id. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
4.Id.
5. Id. at 670-71, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88.
6. Id. at 660, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
7. See Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d 654, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77. The trial court found the
questions were not unjustifiably intrusive because it erroneously applied a reason·
ableness! legitimate interest test to overcome an applicant's constitutional right to pri.
vacy when it should have applied a compelling interest standard.
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Appeal found that the trial court had abused its discretion by
committing an error oflaw9 , It found that the appellants had
established a prima facie case for injunction reliepo,
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court's
denial of the preliminary injunction11,
II,

FACTS

Sibi Soroka, Sue Urry and William d'Arcangelo (hereinafter, "Appellants") were all applicants for security officer
positions at a Target Store (hereinafter, "Respondent"), owned
and operated by Dayton Hudson Corporation (hereinafter,
"Respondent")12, As a condition of employment, Respondent
required all applicants for security officer positions to take a
psychological screening test (hereinafter, "Psychscreen")13,
This test was composed of 704 true-false questions and the
applicants were instructed to answer every question14, The
completed test would be scored and interpreted by a psychological consulting firm 16, The applicants would be rated on five
traits: emotional stability, interpersonal style, addiction potential, dependability and reliability, and socialization16, Based
upon the rating, the firm would recommend whether the appli8. Having determined that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on the merits of
their claims, the trial court did not consider the second requirement for issuing a preliminary injunction, i.e. whether the plaintiffs would suffer greater harm if the
injunction did not issue than the defendant would if it did issue.
9. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. The appellate court determined that the trial court committed several errors oflaw. The reversal of the trial
court was based on its erroneous application ofa reasonableness/legitimate interest
test instead of the compelling interest test.
10. rd. at 672, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89. The appellate court found the questions on
the psychological screening test were unjustifiably intrusive, and thus, the appellants
would likely prevail at trial on the merits of both their constitutional and statutory claims.
In addition, the appellate court found that the appellants would suffer a greater harm
if the injunction did not issue, than would the respondent if the injunction did issue.
11.
12.
13.

rd.
rd.
rd.

16.

rd.

at 658, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
Respondent contends that the test is intended to screen out those applicants who are emotionally unstable, who would not take directions and who would jeopardize customers or other employees. Though security officers do not carry guns, they
do have handcuffs and are authorized to use force in self- defense. Respondent
defends the test as being necessary for safety reasons and to insure fitness for the position. The test is a combination of two psychological tests that have been used to screen
out emotionally unfit applicants for public safety positions such as police officers, pilots,
air traffic controllers and nuclear power plant operators.
14. rd. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
15. rd. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80.
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cants should be hired l7 , This recommendation would carry
great weight in the final hiring decisions l8 ,
Appellants did not challenge the practice of administering
psychological evaluations per se; they challenged certain questions on the "Psychscreen" as being invasive and not job- related l9 , Specifically, Appellants claimed that the questions
regarding religious attitudes 20 and the questions regarding
sexual orientation21 violated their constitutional right to privacy22, the Fair Employment and Housing Act 2S , and the
California Labor Code 24 ,
The trial court held that a job applicant's constitutional
right to privacy may be violated by an employer who could show
a legitimate interest for the violation26, The trial court believed
that the use of the "Psych screen" was reasonable because the
employer had showed a legitimate interest for using it28 , In
addition, the trial court found that the questions regarding religious attitudes were not intended to reveal an applicant's religious beliefs, and thus, were not violative of the Fair Housing
and Employment Act27 , Finally, the trial court held that the
questions regarding sexual orientation were not intended to
17. [d.
IS. [d.
19. [d. at 660, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at SO.
20. [d. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79-S0. The questions regarding religious atti-

tudes included: "I feel sure that there is only one true religion .. .! have no patience with
people who believe there is only one true religion ... My soul sometimes leaves my
body ... A minister can cure disease by praying and putting his hand on your
head ... Everything is turning out just like the prophets of the Bible said it would.. .! go
to church almost every week ... 1 believe in the second coming ofChrist ... I believe in a
life hereaf.\er.. .! am very religious (more than most people).. .! believe my sins are unpardonable .. .! believe there is a God ... I believe there is a Devil and a Hell in afterlife:
21. [d. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at SO. The questions regarding sexual orientation
included: "I wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex ....1 have never been in
trouble because of my sex behavior....1 have been in trouble one or more times because
of my sex behavior .... My sex life is satisfactory....1 am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex .... I have often wished I were a girl.. .. (Or if your are a girl) I have
never been sorry that I am a girL .. .! have never indulged in any unusual sex practices .... I am worried about sex matters ....1 like to talk about sex .... Many of my dreams
are about sex matters."
22. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (1S79, amended 1972).
23. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12920, 12940 (West 19S0).
24. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1101, 1102 (West 19S9).
25. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 661, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at S1.
26. [d. The trial court found that Target had demonstrated a legitimate interest in psychologically screening applicants for security positions to minimize the
potential danger to its customers and others. Presumably, a "legitimate interest" is
sufficient to pass the deferential reasonableness test, whereas it would be insufficient
to pass the more exacting standard of "compelling interest".
27. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 669,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at S7.
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force applicants to reveal their sexual orientation, and thus,
were not violative of the Labor Code 28.
III.
A.

COURT'S ANALYSIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1. standard for permissible violation of privacy right

The appellate court held that the trial court abused its
discretion by committing an error of law when it applied the
wrong standard in assessing a potential violation of the state
constitutional right to privacy39.
The California Constitution provides:
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy"3o.
California courts have held that public and private employers
must justify any intrusion into an employee's privacy by
demonstrating a compelling interest3!. If the employer is able
to show a compelling interest, the employer must still show that
the inquiries were job related 33 .
The question presented here was whether there was a distinction between an employee's privacy rights and an applicant's, i.e., whether the compelling interest standard should
also be applied when questioning job applicants. Appellants
28. [d. at 670, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
29. rd. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
30. Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1 (1879, amended 1972).
31. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774-75, 533 P.2d 222,234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94,
106 (1975) [any intervention into right to privacy must be justified by compelling inter·
est]; Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d I, 17-20, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 618, 626-629 (1990) [public and private employers must demonstrate a compelling
interest] cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 111 S.Ct. 344 (1990); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror
Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1040-43,264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202, (1989) [the right
to privacy is protected from private as well as public employers, but also held that if
the right is not substantially burdened compelling interest may not be required].
32. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666,.1 Cal. App. 2d at 85.
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argued that Respondent was required to demonstrate a compelling interest before intruding on their right to privacy, just
as would be required if they were employees33 •
The trial court, relying on Wilkinson v. Times Mirror
Corporations., which recognized a distinction between employees and applicantsS6 , applied a reasonableness testS8 and held
that the state constitution only required Respondent to show
a legitimate interest in order to overcome a job applicant's right
to privacy". Respondent argued that the "Psychscreen" was
used for screening out emotionally unstable security officer
applicants in order to protect its customersss , which the trial
court found to be a legitimate interest. Using the Wilkinson
reasonableness standard, the court found that Respondent's
legitimate interest was sufficient to overcome Appellants'
right to privacys9.
The appellate court disagreed with Wilkinson's distinction
between employees and job applicants and held that the trial
court's reliance on it amounted to a reversible error oflaw'°. It
held that a compelling interest is uniformly required because
there was no legitimate distinction between the privacy rights
of employees and job applicants". In declining to follow
Wilkinson 42 , the appellate court relied on several sources: 1) an
33. Id. at 663, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82.
34. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 194 (1989) [pre-employment drug testing did not violate job applicants' state
constitutional right to privacy because employer had a legitimate interest and it was
reasonable]. By requiring a mere showing of a legitimate interest to overcome a
job applicant's constitutional right to privacy, this case, by distinguishing between
employees and applicants departed significantly from prior California case law
which had always required a demonstration of a compelling interest to overcome this
right.
35. Id. at 1049, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204: ·Simply put, applicants for jobs ... have a
choice; they may consent to the limited invasion of their privacy resulting from the
[drug] testing, or may decline both the test and the conditional offer of employment."
36. Id. at 1048, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
37. The two standards differ significantly. A compelling interest is a strict
level of judicial scrutiny which is more difficult to prove in order to pass constitutional
muster than the less exacting, deferential reasonableness standard, which requires
only a showing of a legitimate interest.
38. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 658, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
39. Id. at 663, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82.
40. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
41. Id. at 664, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
42. As a matter of stare decisis, an intermediate appellate court's holding is
only binding on inferior courts. Intermediate appellate courts are "not compelled
to apply the law as interpreted by a court of equivalent jurisdiction if [it] find[s] that
court's reasoning unpersuasive". Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 86, n.8.
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examination ofthe legislative history of the state constitutional
amendment which elevated privacy to an enumerated and
inalienable right; 2) pre-Wilkinson case law; and 3) a critical
analysis of the Wilkinson rationale.
a)

legislative history

Before 1972, privacy was not an enumerated right in the
state constitution. In 1972, California voters amended the state
constitution; "California [has] accord[ed] privacy the constitutional status of an inalienable right", on a par with defending life and possessing property"". In its decision, the court
relied heavily on the arguments the state set forth in the ballot pamphlet for the proposed amendment to the constitution 46 • This "ballot argument" encompasses the only legislative
history behind the state constitutional right to privac~. First,
the court noted that the ballot argument provided that the constitutional right to privacy could only be overcome by a compelling interest 4 ? Next, the court found that the voters
affirmatively intended for there to be no distinction between
the privacy rights of employees and job applicants 48 • In sum,
the court found that a requirement of a compelling interest to
overcome a job applicant's privacy right was in accord with the
intent of the voters and thus was constitutionally mandated.
43. An inalienable right is one "which may not be violated by anyone". Wilkinson
v. Times Mirror Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1042, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194. 199
(1989).
44. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 662, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82; see also Luck v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18,267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627
(1990) [Appellate courts have repeatedly held that the right to privacy is an inalienable right] cert. denied, _ U.S. _, III S.Ct. 344 (1990); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror
Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1037, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1989) ["Privacy is ...
considered an inalienable right, which may not be violated by anyone".]; Porten v.
University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829,134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1976).
45. Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) pp. 27-28.
46. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666-67,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
47. 1d. at 665, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84; see Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal.
Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) pp. 27-28; see also White
v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234,120 Cal. Rptr. at 106; Luck v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 20,267 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
48. The appellate court found that when voters amended the constitution, it was
their intent to give inalienable privacy rights to job applicants as well as employees.
"The ballot argument specifically refers tojob applicants when it states, '[e]ach time
we ... interview for a job, ... a dossier is opened and an informational profile is sketched.'"
Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 664, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83; see also, Central Valley Ch. 7th
Step Foundation. Inc. v. Younger, 214 Cal. App. 3d 145, 151, 162- 65, 262 Cal. Rptr.
496,499,506-07 (1989) [applied compelling interest in case involving job applicant].
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pre-Wilkinson case law

The court examined pre-Wilkinson case law and discovered
that no distinction had previously been made between employees and applicants in regard to their privacy rights. For
instance, in Central Valley Chap. 7th Step Foundation, Inc. v.
Younger 49 , a public employer was required to demonstrate a
compelling interest in order to obtain an applicant's arrest
records. The fact that this case involved a public employer was
irrelevant because private and public employers are equally
bound by the terms of the privacy provision60 •
The appellate court was satisfied that the Wilkinson distinction between applicants and employees was not in harmony
with either the legislative history or prior case law.
c)

critical analysis of the Wilkinson rationale

Finally, the appellate court found that Wilkinson's aberrant
rule was derived in part from improper inferences drawn from
Schmidt v. Superior Court 61 • In Schmidt, the petitioners
argued that their constitutional right to familial privacy was
violated by an age-based restriction at a private mobilehome
park62 . The California Supreme Court rejected those claims
because it found that the regulation was "neither irrational or
arbitrary... "63. The Wilkinson court interpreted this holding to
mean that "as long as [the right to privacy] is not substantially
burdened or affected, justification by a compelling interest is
not required. Instead, the operative question is whether the
challenged conduct is reasonable"64.
The appellate court found Wilkinson's interpretation untenable for several reasons. First, it found that the property
interests in Schmidt were distinguishable as being of a less personal nature than the privacy interests contemplated by the
49. Central Valley Chap. 7th Step Foundation, Inc. v. Younger, 214 Cal. App. 3d
145, 262 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1989).
50. Luck, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 19,267 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (1990); Wilkinson v. Times
Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1040-44,264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198-200 (1989) [article 1, section 1 limits private entities].
51. Schmidt v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 3d 370, 769 P.2d 932,256 Cal. Rptr. 750
(1989) [upholding a rule limiting residence in a private mobilehome park to persons
25 years of age or older].
52. [d.
53. [d. at 383, 769 P.2d at 945, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 763.

54. Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1047, 264 Cal. Rptr at 203.
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constitutional amendment&&. Secondly, a reasonableness standard is at odds with the ballot argument which provides solely for a compelling interest standard when privacy interests are
at stake". Finally, the court asserts that if the California
Supreme Court in Schmidt were going to make such a substantial deviation from the previous rule, it would have indicated this unambiguously&7.
After justifying its unwillingness to follow Wilkinson, the
appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by applying the reasonableness test, rather than the
compelling interest test". Furthermore, the appellate court
held that under the proper, compelling interest test, Appellants
were likely to prevail on the merits of their constitutional
claims611•

2.

nexus requirement

In addition to demonstrating a compelling interest,
Respondent also needed to show a nexus between the
"Psychscreen" questions asked and the security officer positions
being applied forso • Respondent asserted that the questions
were job-related because they were used to determine the
emotional stability of its applicants81 • Respondent made general claims that since it implemented the "Psychscreen" it
had seen an overall improvement in the quality and performance of its security officers82 • The trial court, relying on
Wilkinson 83 , held that these generalized claims were sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement. 84
55. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
56. See Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) pp.27-28; White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d
222,234,120 Cal. Rptr. 106, (1975); Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 218
Cal. App. 3d 1,20,267 Cal. Rptr. 618,628-29 (1990), cert. denied _ U.S. _, 111 S.Ct.
344.
57. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 665,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
58. 1d. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
59.1d.
60. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 667,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
61. 1d. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
62.1d.
63. Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1053,264 Cal. Rptr. at 206. [Court held that
an employer has a legitimate interest in not hiring individuals whose drug abuse may
render them unable to perform their job responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. The
court further held a general claim that pre-employment drug testing was related to
this legitimate interest satisfied nexus requirement.]
64. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 667,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
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The appellate court again declined to follow Wilkinson. It
found that the trial court had committed an error of law
because a generalized justification was insufficient to intrude
on an individual's privacy rights 66. To support its conclusions
the court relied on: 1) federal precedent; 2) legislative history; and 3) California Supreme Court decisions 66 .
a)

federal precedent

When interpreting the state right to privacy, California
courts have looked to federal precedents for guidance 67 .
Accordingly, the appellate court considered the federal nexus
requirement. It found that federal courts require "a clear,
direct nexus between the nature of the employee's duty and the
nature of the [privacy] violation"66. Because the California
Constitution enumerates the right to privacy while the Federal
Constitution does not, the state right to privacy is necessarily broader than the federal right69 . Thus, the federal requirement of a "clear, direct nexus" establishes the bare minimum
that is required in California courts70. The appellate court held
that since the state constitution required at least a "clear,
direct nexus", Target's generalized nexus was insufficient to
overcome Appellants' privacy rights. 71
b) legislative history
Next, the appellate court turned to the only legislative
history for the privacy amendment, the ballot argument. The
ballot argument asserted that the right to privacy would "preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous information"72.
The appellate court found that this language supported a negative inference that employers could only compel employees to
65. [d.

66. Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937,719
P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,533 P.2d 222,120
Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
67. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
68. Luck, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 24, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 632 (1990).
69. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
70. [d.
71. [d. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. "In its opposition to Soroka's motion for pre-

liminary injunction, Target made no showing that a person's religious beliefs or sexual orientation have any bearing on the emotional stability to perform a [store
security officer's1 job responsibilities. It did no more than to make generalized claims
about the Psychscreen's relationship to emotional fitness and to assert that it has seen
an overall improvement in [store security officer1 quality and performance since it
implemented the Psychscreen."
72. Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) p. 28.
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answer questions that were "necessary to achieve the purpose for which the information.has been gathered"73.
c)

California Supreme Court decisions

In addition to the legislative history, the appellate court
found that the California Supreme Court had recognized the
nexus requirement. In Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City
of Long Beach 74 , the California Supreme Court held that a
public employer may only require workers to answer questions that are "specifically, directly and narrowly related[d] to
the performance of the employee's official duties"76. In White
v. Davis 76 the Supreme Court held that the privacy amendment
was intended '(to avoid "the overbroad collection ... of unnecessary personal information"77.
In light of these cases, the appellate court found that
Respondent failed to show the requisite clear, direct nexus
between the Psychscreen's questions and its stated purpose of
determining an applicant's emotional stability 78. Since the
information sought was not job-related, the court held the
"collection [was] overbroa'd, and the information unnecessary"79, and thus was unconstitutional.
Therefore, Respondent had failed to show both the compelling interest and the requisite nexus. The appellate court
concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion when
it found that Appellants would not prevail on the merits of their
constitutional claim80 .
B.

STATUTORY CLAIMS

Since the appellate court had already determined that the
injunction should have issued based on Appellants' constitutional claim, determining whether Appellants would have
73. Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen.
Elec.(Nov. 7,1972) p. 28.
74. Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937,719
P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986).
75. Id. at 947,719 P.2d at 670,227 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
76. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222,120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
77. Id. at 775, 533 P.2d at 240,120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
78. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
79. Id. at 667,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
80. Id. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
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prevailed on their statutory claims was unnecessarylll. Despite
this lack of necessity, the appellate court chose to address the
claims for the purpose of guiding the lower court82 • Appellants
contended that they would have prevailed at trial on their
claims that Respondent violated the Fair Housing and
Employment Act83 and the California Labor Code8' .
1.

Fair Housing and Employment Act

The Fair Housing and Employment Act prohibits employers from refusing to hire a person on the basis of their religious
beliefs 86. Employers are also prohibited from making any nonjob-related inquiry that expresses "any specification ... as
to ... religious creed .... "86. The trial court held that the questions
regarding religious attitudes were not intended to reveal the
applicant's religious beliefs87 •
The appellate court disagreed and held that the trial court
had committed an error oflaw68 • The appellate court found that
Appellants had made a prima facie showing of an impermissible
inquiry 89. The burden then shifted to Respondent to prove
that the inquiry was justified as being job-related90 • The court
had already determined in its nexus discussion that the questions regarding religious beliefs were not job-related91 • Thus,
the Psychscreen's questions relating to religious attitudes did
constitute the type of inquiry that the Act expressly prohibits.
Accordingly, the, court determined that Appellants would likely prevail at trial on the merits of this claim92 •
81. [d. at 669, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
82. [d. Because the appellate court was not required to address the statutory
issues, it is unclear whether the remaining discussion is case law or whether it is dicta.
83. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12920, 12940 (West 1980).
84. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1989).
85. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12920, 12940 (West 1980).
86. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 (d) (West 1980).
87. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 669,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
88. [d.

89. To make a prima facie showing of impermissible inquiry, the complainant
must show that the questions asked were intended to reveal their religious beliefs.
Upon a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the respondent to show that their
questions fall into the "job-related" exception provided for in the Act.
90. [d. at 670, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
91. [d. In the nexus discussion, the court held that in order for a question to be
considered job-related, there must at least be a clear, direct nexus between the
inquiry and the purpose sought to be achieved and that the inquiry must be necessary .
to achieve that purpose.
92. [d.
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Labor Code

Sections 1101 and 1102 of the California Labor Code 93 protect an employee's fundamental right to engage in political
activity without employer interference94 • This right was held
to protect applicants as well as employees 96 • In Gay Law
Students u. Pacific Tel. & Tel. CO.96 the California Supreme
Court, per Justice Tobriner, held that being homosexual falls
within the purview of political activity, and thus is protected
by sections 1101 and 1102 of the California Labor Code97 • Gay
Law Students seemed only to prohibit public employers from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Then in
1986, the California Attorney General published his opinion
that Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 also prohibited private
employers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation 98 •
Appellants argued that Respondent was in violation of the
Labor Code because certain questions on the Psychscreen
were intended to reveal the applicant's sexual orientation99 •
The trial court disagreed 1oo • However, the appellate court held
93. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1989).
Section 1101 provides: "No employer shall make, adopt, or
enforce any rule, regulation, or policy: a) forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in politics
or from becoming candidates for public office. b) controlling
or directing, or tending to control or direct the political
activities or affiliations of employees."
Section 1102 provides: "No employer shall coerce or influence
or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by
means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt
or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political action or political activity."
94. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487, 595
P.2d 592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14,32 (1979).
95. ld. at 487 n.16, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
96. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
97. ld. at 487,595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32: Justice Tobriner speaking
for the court: "The struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, particularly in the field of employment, must be recognized as a political activity."
98. 69 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 80, 82 (1986). In 1986, then Assemblyperson Art Agnos,
requested Attorney General John Van De Kamp's opinion as to whether Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 prohibited private employers from discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation. He was of the opinion that they did. The fact that the appellate
court cites this opinion is significant because the record does not evidence any assertion by the trial court that the Labor Code would not apply to a private employer.
99. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 670,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
100. ld.
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that the trial court committed an error of law when it determined that questions such as "I am very strongly attracted by
members of my own sex"IOI were not intended to reveal the
applicant's sexual orientation. The appellate court reasoned
that a person who would identify themselves as homosexual,
might be "stigmatized as ,willing to defy or violate traditional
values and mores"102 and thus would receive low marks for
"socialization"I03. The appellate court held that these questions
were discriminatory as a matter oflaw lO4 . It further held that
Target's practice was an attempt to coerce the applicant to
refrain from expressing a homosexual orientation by the threat
ofloss of employment. Such a practice is an express violation
of the Labor Code l05. The court then concluded that Appellants
would likely have prevailed on the merits of this claim as
well. 106

C.

INTERIM HARM

In order for a preliminary injunction to issue, there must
be proof that the movant will likely prevail on the merits at trial
and that the movant would suffer greater harm if the injunction did not issue than non-movant would if it did issue l07 .
Having determined that Appellants would likely prevail at trial
on the merits of their claims, the appellate court only had to
determine whether Appellants would suffer greater harm if the
injunction did not issue, than Respondent would if it did.
The court found that Appellants would suffer the greater
harm if the injunction were not granted l08 . The appellate
court concluded that both prongs of the preliminary injunction
test had been met and reversed the trial court's denial of the
motion.
101. [d. at 671, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88.
102. [d.
103. [d. "Socialization" is one of the five traits that the Psychscreen is used to
evaluate. It defines socialization as "the extent to which an individual subscribes to
traditional values and mores and feels an obligation to act in accordance with them."
104. [d.
105. [d.
106. [d.
107. Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1039,264 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
108. The harm to Appellants would be significant because they had already
demonstrated a strong probability that the test violated their rights. If no injunction
were issued, Respondent would be allowed to continue to administer the test, putting
Appellants in the precarious position of either surrendering their constitutional
rights or surrendering their option to apply for security officer positions at Target
stores.
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This note is included in the Women's Law Forum primarily because this case stands as the only case law in California
that expressly recognizes that it is illegal in California for
employers, public and private, to discriminate against people
on the basis of sexual orientation. Sexual orientation is not an
enumerated protected class. In 1991, the California state legislature passed Assembly Bill 101 that would have added sexual orientation to the Fair Housing and Employment Act's
list of enumerated protected classes. Similar statewide protective legislation for lesbians and gay men has been enacted
in Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and most
recently, in New Jersey. In September 1991, Governor Wilson
disgraced the state of California when he vetoed the bill.
Defending his action, Wilson claimed that there were already
sufficient protections for homosexuals against employment
discrimination. To support his claim, he pointed to the
California Supreme Court's holding in Gay Law Students
Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. 109

Gay Law Students was a 4-3 decision, and was decided by
a very liberal Supreme Court l1O • If the present conservative
Supreme Court were to have the occasion to reconsider the
rationale supporting Gay Law Students, it might well be overturned. By embracing Gay Law Students and its rationale, the
Court of Appeal is strengthening the shaky ground upon which
our protections rest.
Governor Wilson also cited Attorney General John Van De
Kamp's 1986 opinion 111 to support his claims. This opinion
has gone largely ignored. More importantly, by itself, the
opinion has no force of law. By citing it, the court in Soroka
gave the opinion the force of law.
109. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979). (interpreting homosexuality as political activity, bringing homosexuals within the employment discrimination protection of the Labor
Code).
110. In 1979 the California Supreme Court Justices were: Chief Justice Bird, and
Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Newman, Richardson, Clark, and Manuel. The majority opinion in Gay Law Students was written by Tobriner, with whom Bird, Mosk, and
Newman concurred. Today the California Supreme Court Justices are: Chief Justice
Lucas, and Justices Arabian, Baxter, Broussard, George, Kennard, Panelli, and
Mosk.
111. 69 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 80, 82 (1986). (concluding that the Labor Code
prohibits private employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of
their sexual orientation, private or manifest).
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What is interesting to note, is that there seemed to be no
argument from the trial court about how to interpret the
Labor Code. The courts only disagreed on the interpretation
of the "Psychs ere en" questions. The appellate court referred
to both Gay Law Students and to the Attorney General's opinion without provocation or necessity. It seems that the appellate court wanted to provide very clear guidance for the trial
court. Perhaps it is in the wake of the AB 101 veto that the
court felt compelled to clarify and validate the protections
that Governor Wilson boasted. Although this case is only
binding on lower courts, it represents some hope that other
courts will adhere to and expand upon the present, albeit
sketchy, protections that Governor Wilson felt were adequate
to protect the homosexual population fr.om employment discrimination.
V.

ADDENDUM

At the time of this note's publication, the California
Supreme Court has granted review of this case. As of yet, no
briefing schedule has been set.
The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing another state constitutional right to privacy case, Hill v. NCAA112,
where Stanford University athletes alleged that the National
Collegiate Athletic Association's drug testing policy violated
their state constitutional right to privacy. After that case is
decided, it is likely that the Supreme Court will not review
Soroka, but instead will remand to the appellate court for
reconsideration according to Hill. If Soroka is remanded for
reconsideration on the constitutional claim only, the sexual orientation issue may not be implicated.
However, even if the appellate court is forced to reverse its
position on the constitutional right to privacy issue, the preliminary injunction should still issue because the appellate
112. Hill v. N.C.A.A, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1714, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1990); review
granted December 20,1990. In this case, student athletes sued the National Collegiate
Athletic Association seeking to have the NCAA enjoined from enforcing its drug testing program. The Superior Court, Santa Clara County found that the program violated student athletes' state constitutional right to privacy. The Court of Appeal, Sixth
District affirmed. That court held 1) the state constitutional right to privacy extends
to voluntary, private association's actions; and 2).drug testing program violated
state constitutional right to privacy because association did not show compelling
need for program.
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court found that Appellants would likely prevail on their
statutory claims. But a decision based solely on the statutory claims promotes the real possibility that the sexual
orientation issue will resurface as the target of dispute. This
is disconcerting because of the fear that the current conservative Court may overturn Gay Law Students, one of the only
existing protections for the gay community.
Solace exists however. Without Gay Law Students, the
lack of protection for lesbians and gay men in employment will
be so conspicuous that Governor Wilson will be unable to
assert otherwise when the new AB 101-type bill, just introduced
in the California Legislature, (hopefully) arrives on his desk.
Albeit oddly paradoxical, if Gay Law Students were overturned, Governor Wilson might be forced to sign the new gay
rights bill into law because he would be unable to defend a veto
of the new bill on the grounds that there were adequate protections already in place.

Michael Weiss*

-Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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FAMILY LAW
LESBIAN PARENTING

1.

Refusal to grant custody or visitation rights to lesbian
partner who shared equally in parenting of children
with partner, the natural mother.

Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 212 (1991). In Nancy S. v. Michele G.,t the California
Court of Appeal, First District, unanimously affirmed the trial
court's ruling that a lesbian, who had shared equally in the parenting of two children with her partner, the children's natural
mother, was unable to establish the existence of a parentchild relationship under the Uniform Parentage Act2 • Without
establishing such status, the lesbian partner had no legal
rights to visit with or have custody of the childrens• The appellate court further affirmed that the natural mother was the only
legal parent of the two minor children, entitling her to sole legal
and physical custody'. Therefore, any further contact between
the lesbian partner and the children would require the natural mother's consent6 •
I.

FACTS

Nancy (hereinafter, "Respondent") and Michele (hereinafter,
"Appellant") began living together in August 1969. In
November of that year they had a private "marriage ceremony"6. Eventually, they decided to have children together by
inseminating Respondent 7 • Respondent gave birth to two children: K. in June 1980, and S. in June 19848 • In both instances,
Appellant was listed on the birth certificate as the father and
both children were given Appellant's family name 9 • Both children referred to Appellant as "Mom"lo. Appellant and
1. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831,279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991).
Uniform Parentage Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 7000 et seq. (West 1983).
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 831,279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
Id. at 835, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
1d. at 834, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
6. 1d. The court did not decide whether the marriage was entitled to any legal

2.
3.
4.
5.

recognition because Appellant did not raise the issue.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9. 1d.
10.1d.
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Respondent had considered arranging for Appellant to adopt
the children, but they never initiated the formal adoption proceedings 11.
In January 1985, Appellant and Respondent separated l2 •
For the next three years the parties abided by an agreement that
K would live with Appellant and S. would live with Respondent l3 •
Respondent wanted to change the arrangement so that both children would be with each adult fifty percent of the time l4 •
Appellant opposed any change and attempts to mediate the
dispute failed 16 • Respondent commenced this action under the
Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter "UPA") seeking three declarations: 1) that Appellant was not a parent of either child; 2)
that Respondent, as the biological mother, was entitled to sole
legal and physical custody; and 3) that Appellant was entitled
to visitation only with Respondent's consent l6 • Appellant sought
to qualify as a parent in order to attain rights of custody and visitation under the UPA t7 · Appellant admitted that she was not the
biological mother and had not adopted the children, but argued
that notwithstanding the UPA, she had either attained the status of a de facto parentiS, or alternatively that Respondent
should be estopped to deny Appellant's status as a parent 19 •
The trial court found that Appellant was not a parent
under the UPA. Thus, even if Appellant could prove that she
had attained the status of de facto parent, the court was
without jurisdiction to grant the visitation and custody rights,
over the objections of Respondent, who did qualify as a parent under the act 20 • Further, by denying Appellant all relief,
the court also impliedly found as a matter of law that
Appellant could not attain the status of a parent by equitable
estoppel 21 •
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 835,279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.

18. A "de facto" parent is defined in In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 692, 523 P.2d 244,
253, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 453 (1974) at n.18 as "that person who, on a day-to-day basis,
assumes the role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his
psychological need for affection and care". Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d
at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
19. [d.
20. [d. at 835 n.2., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
21. [d. at 835 n.l., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
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COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

JURISDICTION.

871

The Court of Appeal first decided whether the trial court
had jurisdiction· to award custody and/or visitation rights to
Appellant. The court held that the trial court did have jurisdiction. "A court .. Jacks 'jurisdiction' only ifit has no power to
render a decision over the subject in dispute"22. It cited Curiale
v. Reagan2S, a case strikingly similar to the case at bar, but
where the court lacked jurisdiction24 • There, the lesbian partner was asserting that she was a de facto parent, as opposed
to a parent. The case was dismissed because the court lacked
the power to decide whether she was a de facto parent. The case
here is distinguishable in that Appellant had always maintained that she was a parent, as opposed to a de facto parent.
In addition, Appellant did not institute the proceedings here,
as the lesbian partner in Curiale did. Thus, the appellate
court, here, found that the trial court did have jurisdiction
under the UPA to make the parental determination26 • Upon
22. [d. at 835 n.2., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.

23. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990).
24. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597,272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990), involved
two lesbians disputing the custody of their child, conceived during their relationship by
artificial insemination. The Curiale court held that 1) plaintiff, non- biological mother
lacked standing to bring an action for custody and/or visitation; and 2) that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award custody and/or visitation rights over the
objections of the "natural" mother. Plaintiff had asserted that Civil Code section 7015
(UPA) conferred standing upon any interested person to bring an action to determine
the existence of a parent-child relationship. Cal. Civ. Code § 7015 (West 1983). On
appeal, the court held that Civil Code section 7015 (UPA) had no application where
the defendant was the undisputed natural mother of the child. Curiale v. Reagan, 222
Cal. App. 3d at 1600,272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Plaintiff asserted that Civil Code section
4600 (Family Law Act) conferred subject matter jurisdiction. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600
(West 1983). It provides in relevant part: "In any proceeding where there is at issue
the custody ofa minor child, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or
at any time thereafter, make such orderfor the custody of the child during minority
as may seem necessary or proper." [d. at 1600 n.2., 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. On appeal,
the court held that Civil Code section 4600 did not create subject matter jurisdiction;
there had to be an independent basis. [d. at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. It held that
jurisdiction to adjudicate custody depended on some proceeding properly before the
court such as dissolution, dependency, or guardianship. [d. The court concluded that
it had no jurisdiction to award custody or visitation rights to plaintiff because plaintiff had no colorable claim of right to custody and there was no statutory basis for plaintiffs claim of parental status. [d. at 1598, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. On appeal, the court
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs claim.
25. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 835, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215
(1991). The distinction the court makes between the cases is unclear. In Curiale, the
lesbian partner sought standing through the UPA and subject matter jurisdiction
through the Family Law Act. The court denied both claims, arguably because without
standing, the proceeding involving custody was not properly before the court. Curiale
v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521. In Nancy S., the
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finding that Appellant was not a parent under the UPA, the
trial court had jurisdiction to deny Appellant custody and/or
visitation rights 28 •

B.

PARENTAL STATUS DETERMINATION UNDER THE UPA.

The appellate court next decided whether the trial court correctly found that Appellant was not a parent under the UPA
definition. The UPA defines a parent as one who is the natural or adoptive parent of a child27 • The appellate court reviewed
the undisputed facts and held that the trial court correctly
determined that Appellant could not establish parental status
under the UPA because: 1) Appellant was not the natural
mother; 2) she had not adopted either of the children; and 3)
she did not contend that she and Respondent had a legally recognized marriage when the children were born28 •
C.

SIGNIFICANCE OF UPA PARENTAL STATUS.

Whether a party has the status of a parent or a non-parent
is of critical importance because that status dictates the proper test to be applied in a custody/visitation dispute under
Civil Code section 460029 • Ifboth parties have parental status,
the award of custody or visitation will be decided on the basis
lesbian partner did not need to establish standing because the natural mother brought
the action. It appears that subject matter jurisdiction was held to exist because the
action (determining parentage under UPA) was a proceeding properly before the
court where custody was at issue. However, a determination of parentage under the
UPA is not an enumerated proceeding upon which jurisdiction depends, i.e. dissolution, guardianship, or dependency. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 522.
26. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 835 n.2., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
27. Cal. Civ. Code § 7001 (West 1983).
28. Nancy S. v. Michele G. 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. By referring to the existence of a legally recognized marriage, the court followed a rebuttable
presumption in the state of California that a man who is legally married to a woman
is the natural father of the children she bears during the marriage. (Cal. Civ. Code
§ 7004(a)( 1) (West 1983). The court seemed to imply that if Appellant had contended
that she and respondent had a legally recognized marriage it would have made a difference. This could be of notable importance as gay and lesbian relationships become
more recognized by the Legislature and the courts. For example, in some cities,
domestic partnership legislation allows lesbian and gay couples to officially register
their relationships at City Hall. In San Francisco, health care benefits for city employees, previously only extended to the spouses of city employees, were recently extended to domestic partners. Perhaps as the concept of domestic partnerships becomes more
widespread, a similar conclusive presumption of parentage would apply as to the children born during the partnership.
29. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (West 1983) is also known as the Family Law Act.
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of the "best interests" of the child30. If one of the parties is
unable to establish the status of parent, the determination to
award custody to the non-parent will be reached based on a twoprong test31 .
Therefore, if the court had granted Appellant the status of
parent, she would have been entitled to seek custody and visitation over the objections of the "natural" mother based solelyon the "best interests" of the children. The determination
that Appellant did not have the status of a parent meant that
she had the additional burden of proving to the court that an
award of sole custody to Respondent would be detrimental to
the children32. The court articulated the two-pronged test,
but did not apply it.
D.

THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES.

Appellant was unable to establish the status of parent
under the UPA, but contended that the UPA did not provide the
exclusive definition of a parent33. She asserted several legal
theories: 1) de facto parent; 2) in loco parentis; and 3) parent
by equitable estoppel, in support of her argument that as a "psychological parent" both she and Respondent should stand on
equal footing, as two legally recognized parents34.

1.

De Facto

The court dismissed Appellant's argument that establishing de facto parenthood would give her status of a parent.
"These facts may well entitle [A]ppellant to the status of a 'de
facto' parent. It does not, however, follow that as a 'de facto'
parent [A]ppellant has the same rights as a parent to seek custody and visitation over the objection of the children's natural·
mother."36 The court relied on In re B.G. 36, where it was held
30. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (West 1983). Subsection (b) provides in pertinent part:
"Custody should be awarded in the following order of preference according to the best interests of the child ... : (1) [t]o
both parents jointly .... "
31. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (West 1983). Subsection (c) provides in pertinent
part: "Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other
that a parent, without the consent of the parents, [1] it shall make a finding that an
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and [2] the award to
a non-parent is required to serve the best interests of the child."
32. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (c) (West 1983).
33. Nancy S. 11. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
34.Id.
35. Id. at 837, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
36. In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
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that de facto parents could not be awarded custody over the
objections of the natural mother unless it were shown that custody to the natural mother would be detrimental to the child37 •
Thus, even if Appellant were to establish that she was a de facto
parent, the two-prong test would still be applied.

2.

In Loco Parentis

Next, Appellant asserted that the common law doctrine of
"in loco parentis"38 could be applied to confer upon her the
same rights as a parent to seek custody and visitation39 • In loco
parentis has been used in other contexts to confer parental
rights and obligations on non-parents 40 • The court here, however, held that in loco parentis could not be applied in a custody context. The court relied on Perry v. Superior Court'l
where in loco parentis was referred to in a custody/visitation
context. Perry held that the trial court had no authority to
award custody or visitation unless the minor was a "child of the
marriage"'2. In a concurring opinion, Associate Justice Hopper
suggested that if the "oo.[hlusband had raised the issue and had
been found by the superior court to be in loco parentis with
regard to the [childl, one could conclude that the [childl was a
'child of the marriage' within Civil Code section 4351 ".s. The
court cited Perry to illustrate that in loco parentis in a custody/visitation dispute has only been referred to as a way to
establish that a minor was a child of the marriage for jurisdictional purposes. The court refused to expand the doctrine to
confer parental rights on a non-parent in a custody dispute.

3.
(a)

Equitable Estoppel/Equitable Adoption / Equitable Parent
Equitable Estoppel:

Appellant next argued that Respondent should be estopped
to deny the parent-child relationship between the children
37. rd. at 692·95, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 456·58.
38. In loco parentis is defined as: -[iln the place ofa parent; instead of a parent;
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." Black's Law
Dictionary 896 (4th ed. 1968).
39. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 838,279 Cal.Rptr. at 219.
40. In Costello v. Hart, 23 Cal. App. 3d 898, 100 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1972), in loco par·
entis was used to hold a non·parent liable, 88 a parent would have been, in a tort context.
41. Perry v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980).
42. Perry, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 481, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 584. Civil Code section 4351
requires that the minor, whose custody is at issue, be a child of the marriage before
the court can award custody or visitation. Cal. Civ. Code § 4351 (West 1983).
43. Perry, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 484, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 586·87. (Associate Justice
Hopper, concurring).
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and Appellant because Respondent had encouraged and supported that relationship for many years, and now denied it in
order to gain sole legal custody44. The court dismissed
Appellant's argument relying on the fact that equitable estoppel had never before been used against a natural parent in a
custody battle with a non- parent.
The doctrine had, however, been used by natural mothers
against nonbiological fathers to estop them from denying
paternity in order to avoid child support obligations46 • The court
referred to a Wisconsin case, In re Paternity of D.L.H46, where
the non-parent "father" was permitted to prove the elements
of equitable estoppel in a paternity suit for custody and visitation rights. However, the court, there, reserved the question
of whether, even if he were able to establish the elements of
equitable estoppel47 , he would have attained the status of a parent in a custody dispute. The court, here, distinguished the use
of equitable estoppel in In re Paternity of D.L.H. 46, by noting
that "the use of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in these outof-state cases, is rooted in '[o]ne of the strongest presumptions in law, [i.e.], that a child born to a married woman is the
legitimate child of her husband'''49, then added that no similar
presumption applies here60 •
(b)

Equitable ParentlEquitable Adoption:

Next, the "court distinguishes the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, asserted by Appellant, from the concept of an "equitable parent"61. Equitable parent was recognized in Michigan,
in Atkinson v. Atkinson62 , a custody dispute where the husband,
albeit the nonbiological father, was allowed to stand on equal
footing against the natural mother of the child pursuant to the
best interests of the child63 • The court explained that "equitable
44. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
45. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979);
Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658,11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961).
46. In re Paternity ofD.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (1987).
47. The elements ofequitable estoppel are set forth in In re Paternity ofD.L.H.,
142 Wis. 2d 606, 610, 419 N.W. 2d 283,286 (1987) as follows: 1) action or nonaction
which induces 2) reliance by another 3) to his detriment.
48. In re Paternity ofD.L.H, 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (1987).
49. Runner, Protecting A Husband's Parental Rights When His Wife Disputes The
Presumption Of Legitimacy, 28 J. Fam. L. 116 (1989-90).
50. Nancy S. v, Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
51. Id. at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
52. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W. 2d 516 (1987).
53. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
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parent" differs from "equitable estoppel" in that "equitable
parent" is related to the "equitable adoption" theory which operates for the purposes of inheritance by a child from the estate
of a non-parent64 • The Michigan court reasoned that if a "nonparent" would be a "parent" in death (for inheritance purposes), they ought to be a "parent" in life (for custody purposes)M.
Though California, like Michigan recognizes "equitable adoption" for inheritance purposes", it has declined in at least one
other case to extend the concept to a custody proceeding&1.

4.

New Definition of Parenthood

Appellant finally urged the court to adopt a broader definition of parenthood than the UPA to protect relationships
between children and those who function as their parents.
Under this proposed definition, the class of persons entitled to
seek custody and visitation according to the same standards as
a natural parent, would include "anyone who maintains a
functional parental relationship with a child when a legally recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that
the relationship be parental in nature"". The court refused to
accept this expanded definition because it feared the complex
practical, social, and constitutional ramifications of such an
expansion69•
III.

A.

CRITIQUE
JURISDICTION.

The court relied on Curiale 80 to illustrate that in some custody/visitation cases the problem is one of standing and jurisdiction. Though the opposite result was reached here, the
court failed to distinguish the cases in a manner that
54. rd.
55. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. at 605, 408 N.W.2d at 519.
56. Cal.Prob.Code § 6408 (West 1983).
57. In re Marriage of Lewis and Goetz, 203 Cal. App. 3d 514, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1988). The court declined to adopt the equitable parent theory to award a stepfather
joint custody over the objection of the natural mother. The court declined to do this
in large part because Civil Code § 4351.5, adopted only a few years prior, specifically governed the rights of a stepparent. The court also felt that it was better left to the
legislature because of the Mcomplex practical, social and constitutional ramifications" of expanding the dass of persons entitled to assert parental rights.
58. PolikofT, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian·Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
Georgetown L.J. 459,464 (1990).
59. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 841,279 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
60. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597,272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990).
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provides any insight or guidance to future cases. What remains
are the following inferences: 1) there is no statutory basis for
a lesbian partner to assert standing to sue a natural mother for
custody, and thus, a court is precluded from having jurisdiction
to decide the case61 when the nonbiological mother institutes the
proceeding, and 2) when the natural mother institutes the proceeding, the court will only have jurisdiction to decide the case
if the lesbian partner asserts that she is a parent62 •
B.

Parental Status Determination Under the UPA.

Upon determining that Appellant did not fit into the definition of a parent under the UPA, the court decided that she was
a non-parent. This determination has tremendous legal significance. Appellant, known as "Mom" in the eyes of the children,
became a "stranger" in the eyes of the law. The UPA definition
is extremely narrow. In order for a lesbian partner to claim any
parental rights, she must adopt the children. Under the UPA,
a person who adopts a child is a parent, and thus stands on equal
footing with natural parent in a custody/visitation dispute and
can assert solely the best interests of the child standard. This
would seem to be true whether the adoptive parent had participated in the parenting since the child's birth or had only recently been acquainted with the child. Conversely, a person who has
acted as a parent for eight years since birth, but has not formally
adopted, as here, is unable to attain the status of parent under
the UPA, and is unable to stand on equal footing with the natural parent. Thus, neither the duration nor the quality of the
relationship bear any significance.

a

The only route left for the non-parent is to establish
parental status under equitable doctrines such as de facto
parent or in loco parentis. However, even if she succeeds, her
rights will still be subordinate to the natural mother. The
courts seems resistant, no matter how unfair the result, to
award custody/visitation to a non-parent over the objections of
a "UPA parent".
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF UPA PARENTAL STATUS.
The court dictates that the test to be applied is the two
pronged "detriment to the childrenlbest interests of the
children" test, but then does not apply it to the facts of this case.
61. See Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990).
62. Nancy S. IJ. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 835 n.2, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
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The court fails to examine the possibility that awarding sole
custody to Repondent, with no visitation rights for Appellant,
could be a detriment to the children and not in their best
interests, because they would be denied the parental relationship with Appellant that they had both known since birth.
This would be especially true for K. because she lived with both
parties until she was five, and then with Appellant until she
was eight. Both children had formed the kind of trusting and
loving relationship with Appellant that children form with
their parents. By denying the children contact with Appellant,
they suffer the loss of this special, parent-like relationship. As
to the second prong, Appellant might have contended that the
best interests of the children would be most adequately served
by having substantial contact with her; having two parent-type
influences on the children would be better than only one.
Furthermore, the court, in failing to do more than state the
test, provides no guidance or clarity regarding what "detriment"
means. Civil Code § 4600 (c) does not define detriment63 •
Presumably, if a parent were found unfit for parenting, detriment to the child would be obvious. But, arguably, if detriment
were only capable of being established by a finding of unfitness,
the statute would have stated this unequivocally. Possibly the
Legislature envisioned that children could be detrimented in
a variety of ways, even where a parent was found to be perfectly
fit for parenting.
In In re B.G.64, the California Supreme Court held that
custody may be awarded to a non-parent despite the fact that
the natural parent was expressly found fit to be a parent66 •
Clearly, unfitness is not a prerequisite to finding detriment to
the children. Thus, the fact that Appellant did not contend that
Respondent was unfit should not have rendered the issue
moot, nor excused the court from applying the test. A reasonable argument could have been made that the award of sole
custody to Respondent was detrimental to the children, despite
the fact that Respondent was not unfit, because the children
would be denied their parent-like relationship with Appellant.
63. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (c) (West 1983).
64. In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
65. Id. at 681, l14 Cal. Rptr. at 445: Justice Tobriner, speaking for the Court, concluded "that under [Civil Code section 4600] it is no longer essential that a court, to
award custody to a non-parent, find the parent unfit to care for the child".
The language Tobriner uses indicates that a finding of unfitness was previously required .

.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/9

58

Barnett et al.: California Law Survey

1992]

SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW

879

Additionally, the court makes no distinction between custody and visitation rights, and essentially treats them as inextricably entwined. Even if the court had applied the test and
ultimately found that sole custody to Respondent would not
meet the detriment requirement, a complete denial of visitation rights to Appellant would certainly be a detriment. By
holding that all further contact between the Appellant and the
children must be by Respondent's consent, the court appears
not even to have considered whether the children would be
detrimented. "Reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to
a parent unless it is shown that such visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the discretion of
the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any
other person having an interest in the welfare of the child"66.
By not granting custody rights or any reasonable visitation
rights, which the court clearly has the discretion to do, it
seems that the court has taken the position that the best
interests of the children could not be served by a continuing
relationship with a lesbian partner. By taking an all or nothing approach, the court has taken away from S. and K. the person whom they know as "Mom". Thus, the court appears also
to have totally disregarded the second prong of the proposed
test, the best interests of these children.
D.

THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES.

1.

De Facto.

The appellate court held that even if Appellant could establish de facto status she would still have to meet both prongs of
the test, rendering her de facto status meaningless. The court,
however, does not reach a conclusion regarding Appellant's de
facto status, and thus did not apply the test. Interestingly, the
court did indicate that Appellant would likely have been able to
establish de facto status67 . Its failure to reach a conclusion as to
whether Appellant would qualify as a de facto parent combined
with the court's total avoidance of applying the test supports an
inference that the court believed that the Appellant's claim
66. In re Halpern, 133 Cal. App. 3d 297, 305,184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 744 (1982), citing Cal. Civ. Code § 4601 (West 1983).[non- biological -father" unsuccessfully sought
visitation rights with his ex-wife's minor child after she sought child support from him
in the dissolution of their marriage].
67. -These facts may well entitle [Alppellant to the status of a 'de facto' parent.... "
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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would certainly fail under the two-pronged test. This belief
arguably stems from the court's bias underlying its entire analysis, that it would not be a detriment to the children to deny them
all contact with a lesbian partner and that their best interests
were not served by allowing their continued relationship with
her. By failing to apply the test, the court suggests that such a
conclusion is obvious. However, the court is hesitant to explicitly articulate its bias, possibly because it was uncertain of its
ability to prevail on this position.
Arguably, by avoiding ruling on whether Appellant was a
de facto parent, the court was indirectly suggesting that applying the test would be futile. Alternatively, if a finding of de facto
had been made, the court would have been required to justify
the denial of contact between two children and the person
they call "Mom" as being in the children's best interest, and to
show that it was not to their detriment.

2.

In Loco Parentis.

The court quickly dispensed with Appellant's in loco parentis argument by holding that since the doctrine had never
been applied to confer parental rights on a non-parent in a custody dispute before, it could not be done. The P erry88 court,
being dissatisfied with the result in the case, invited the
Legislature to address the concerns of step-parents who establish close relationships with their stepchildren. The Legislature
did so by enacting Civil Code section 4351.5 89 , providing a
limited form of visitation rights for stepparents. In contrast,
this court did not expressly invite the Legislature to address
the concerns of lesbian and gay parents.

3.
(a)

Equitable Estoppel/Equitable Parent / Equitable Adoption.
Equitable Estoppel:

The reasoning here was much like the in loco parentis
analysis. Equitable estoppel had been applied to impose
support obligations on a husband who represented to his
wife's children that he was their natural father, and then
sought to deny paternity for the purpose of avoiding support
obligations 70 • The court held that equitable estoppel may be
68. Perry v. Superior, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480,166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980).
69. Cal. Civ. Code § 4351.5 (West 1983).
70. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal.App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) and
Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961).
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appropriately applied against a non-parent to make them pay
support as a parent would71. On the other hand, the court holds
that a non-parent may not use equitable estoppel against a parent to seek visitation or custody. The court does not justify why
the doctrine can only be applied against a non-parent, but
simply asserts that it does not work reciprocally in the non-parent's favor. If a non- parent can unwillingly be made a parent
in the eyes of the law, there should also be ways for the nonparent to establish parenthood under the same circumstances.
Again, the court is content with relying on the fact that the doctrine has never before been applied in California in the custody/visitation context, and therefore cannot be applied here.
The court cites, In re Paternity of D.L.H.72, where in a very
progressive step the court allowed a non-parent to seek custody
by trying to establish equitable estoppel. The Wisconsin court
recognized that rights of parenthood might be judicially granted without legislative permission. In an effort to avoid reading this decision as based on sound equitable policy, which then
it would have to justify not following here, the court here
attributed this progressive judicial posture in D.L.H. to the
antiquated, patriarchal presumption that the husband is the
father 73 •
(b)

Equitable ParentlEquitable Adoption:

The court then goes on to distinguish the equitable estoppel doctrine from the "equitable parent" concept. The "equitable
parent" concept was recognized in Michigan in a divorce proceeding to permit the husband/non-biological father to obtain
the status of a parent in a custody dispute with the natural
mother, and to have the dispute settled as between two natural parents: according to the child's best interests 7.. The court
distinguished Appellant's equitable estoppel theory from the
Atkinson "equitable parent" theory, noting that the latter is
rooted in a statutory recognition of the "equitable adoption" theory for purposes of intestate succession 76 • California and
Michigan courts recognize the doctrine of "equitable adoption" which allows a child to take an intestate share in a person's estate who was not their parent, but who acted like one?s.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
In re Paternity ofD.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (1987).
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987).
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
Cal. Prob. Code § 6408 (West 1983).
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However, in Atkinson, the court was willing to recognize the
reciprocity of that theory: "[i]f a person would be a parent in death,
they should be considered a parent in life"77. The Michigan
court adopted this doctrine of "equitable parent" and held that
a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or
conceived during the marriage may be considered the natural
father of that child where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a
relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce; (2) the husband desires to have the rights
afforded to a parent; and (3) the husband is willing to take on the
responsibility of paying child support78.
Though California statutorily recognizes "equitable adoption"79, it has not yet recognized "equitable parent." The court
here refers to one other case that has declined to adopt the
"equitable parent" theoryBO. However, In re Marriage ofLewis and
Goetz 8 ! is distinguishable from the case at bar because the
Legislature had enacted Civil Code § 4351.5 82 which specifically addressed the right of stepparents to seek a limited award of
visitation. Here, there is no statute that addresses lesbian families. The court ignores the distinction, and defers to the
Legislature once again, taking refuge behind the shield of the
"complex practical, social, and constitutional ramifications" of
expanding the class of persons entitled to assert parental rights 83 •

4.

New Definition of Parenthood

Based on its treatment of the equitable arguments
Appellant had already asserted, it was not surprising that
the court refused to accept this argument. Arguably, if the court
had wanted to find that Appellant was entitled to some parental
rights based on her relationship to the children, it would have
done so before reaching this issue. This argument however
would have provided a sound policy basis for the court to conclude that Appellant was entitled to visitation rights or shared
custody.
77.
78.
79.
80.
(1988).

Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. at 605, 408 N.W.2d at 518.
[d. at 605, 408 N.W.2d at 518.
Cal. Prob. Code § 6408 (West 1983).
In re Marriage of Lewis and Goetz, 203 Cal.App.3d 514, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30

81. [d.

82. Cal. Civ. Code § 4351.5 (West 1983).
83. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840,279 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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CONCLUSION

The outcome of this case underscores the legal void in
which lesbians and gay men frequently find themselves, and
the heavy price we pay for being outside the mainstream.
Non-traditional families are not afforded the same kinds of protection that other, traditional families are. The Legislature
needs to address the realities of contemporary life. In the
absence of clear guidelines, gay men and lesbians are not able
to protect themselves from devastating results such as this one.
The lack oflegislation does not deter the non-traditional family from existing; it only leads to more litigation and inconsistent outcomes. As long as the law requires that a child can
only have two natural parents, one of each sex, and grants them
all the attendant rights of parenthood, while granting others
none, non- traditional families will suffer the agony and humiliation of legal nonexistence. For lesbian and gay families,
the ideal solution would be to revise the Uniform Parentage Act,
expanding its definition of parent. The revision would need to
address lesbian and gay parents, and also other non-traditional families such as foster parents and stepparents. The language of the revision would need to be broad to address the
diversity of circumstances. However, there is another consideration. All parents, traditional and otherwise, would probably agree that the definition of parent should not become so
broad as to undermine the policy that those who are parents
should be afforded special rights. If nearly anyone could claim
parental status under the revised UPA definition, there would
not be any point in having a UPA. No parent would want to find
themselves being called into a custody battle over their child,
with the neighbor, the baby sitter, or the teacher at school. The
effort to revise the UPA should be concentrated on striking the
balance between generality, to allow legitimate claims, and
specificity, to exclude all others.

Michael Weiss*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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In the absence ofparental preference, the best interests
of the child control custody decisions.

Adoption of Matthew B. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 284 Cal.
Rptr. 18 (1991). Adoption of Matthew B.l is the first case
focusing on surrogate parenting that has reached the Appellate
level in the California Court system. As such, it can be expected to have importance in future cases. The importance of this
case, however, does not lie in the court's ruling on issues inherent to surrogate parenting as the court's judgement was primarily dependent upon procedural issues. The real importance
of Adoption of Matthew B. lies in the court's dictum. This
may be viewed as an indication of how the courts will decide
cases of this type until legislation is enacted to fill the widening gulf created by the techno-medical advances in the field of
infertility treatment.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1984, appellant Nancy B. contacted the Center for
Reproductive Alternatives expressing an interest in becoming
a surrogate mother.3 According to Nancy's application, her primary motivation was a desire to have a positive birth experience and "to give the gift of a child to a couple that could not
otherwise have children".3 She expressed strong feelings
against becoming a single mother and did not want the responsibility of raising a child.·
Nancy and the Respondent, M's, were first introduced at the
Center for Reproductive Alternatives in April of 1985. 6 At
their next meeting in May of 1985, the provisions and legal considerations of a proposed surrogate parenting contract were discussed in great detail. 6 Subsequent to that discussion, Nancy
met with a private attorney who had been hired for her but paid
for by the M's. 7 The terms of the contract specified Timothy M.
as the natural father and his wife Charlotte as the adopting
mother.8 After discussions which included the potential
1. Adoption of Matthew B., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239,284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1991).
2. Id. at 1251.
3.ld.
4.ld.
5. Id. at 1252.
6.ld.
7.ld.
8.ld.
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illegality and unenforceability of the contract, and after several modifications were made at her request, Nancy signed the
contract in June of 1985.9
Nancy became pregnant and delivered a boy, Matthew,
nine months later on September 1, 1986}O Nancy designated
Timothy as the father on the birth certificate and signed a form
authorizing the hospital to release Matthew to the M.'s, citing
the purpose as adoption planning. ll On September 23, 1986
Timothy filed a paternity action and a judgment was entered
by stipulation declaring Timothy to be Matthew's father and
granting him sole custody.12
Charlotte filed a petition for stepparent adoption on
September 25. 13 On November 13, 1986, Nancy presented
Charlotte with a signed consent to Charlotte's adoption of
Matthew. 14 The occasion also marked Nancy's first contact
with Matthew since Timothy and Charlotte took the baby
home from the hospital. 16
In late February of 1987 the relationship between Nancy
and the M's began to deteriorate and the M's decided that it was
no longer in Matthew's best interest to allow Nancy to continue
contact with him.18
Nancy filed a petition on July 2,1987 seeking to withdraw
her consent to the stepparent adoption and seeking periods of
custody of Matthew. 17 At the close of hearings Nancy moved to
amend her petition and she moved to vacate the paternity
judgement. IS Both motions were denied. 19 Although the case
of Adoption of Matthew B. consolidates both appeals, this
paper will be concerned only with the petition to withdraw consent to the stepparent adoption.
II.

ANALYSIS

California Civil Code § 226a addresses the matter of a natural parent's withdrawal of consent to the adoption of their
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14. Id. at 1253.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17. Id.
18.Id.
19.Id.
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child. In pertinent part § 226a states: "Once given, consent of
the natural parent to the adoption of the child by the person
or persons to whose adoption of the child the consent was
given, may not be withdrawn except with court approval. tt20 For
approval to be granted, two conditions must be met; first, withdrawal must be reasonable in view of all the circumstances and
second, it must be in the best interests of the child. 21

A.

REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

Substantial discretion is vested in the trial court due to the
intangibility of the values that are reflected in the requirements
for withdrawal. These intangibles include in part, "the
demeanor, attitudes, intonation, sincerity, and personality of the
witnesses as well as more exact concerns as to the relative fitness of the parties, educationaL. opportunities for the child, the
emotional and love attachments the parties have for the child
and the child's mental and physical health. "22 Its decision may
be reversed only on a finding of an abuse of discretion, that is,
only if the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.23
1.

Illegality of the contract

The appellate court found no merit in Nancy's argument on
the illegality of the contract for two reasons. First, the question of illegality was not raised in the original petition. 24
Section 226a requires that petitions for withdrawal of consent
"shall be in writing and shall set forth the reasons for withdrawal..."26 Nancy's original petition did not ever allege the
existence of a surrogate contract. The appellate court held that
as a result of this failure to comply with § 226a, the trial court
properly refused to decide the issue of illegality of the surrogate parenting contract.
Secondly even if the issue had been raised, it would not have
helped Nancy's argument. 2S After finding that there was no
need to determine the illegality of the surrogate parenting
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226(a) (amended 1988, repealed 1991, current version CAL.
CIV. CODE § 227.46)(West Supp. 1992).
21. 1d.
22. 1d., citing, Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254, at 267,135 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1977). (Appeal from a holding that allowed the natural mother to withdraw
her consent to adoption. Affirmed.)
23. Matthew B., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239 at 1254.
24. 1d. at 1255.
25. CAL. CIV. CODE supra note 23, at 6.
26. 1d.
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contract, the Court went on to state the insignificance of the
issue of illegality to the case at hand. Applying traditional contract law, it stated "[c]ourts generally will not assist parties who
seek to obtain relief by showing they entered into an illegal
transaction. "27 Furthermore, "courts will not intercede where
the parties have fully performed under the illegal contract"28
and where "the parties assumed the risk of illegality in entering into the contract."29
This dicta is significant because of the C,ourt's speculation as to the outcome had the contract been found to be illegal. Based on the premise that primary consideration should
be given to public policy and how it would best be served, the
Court found the overriding interest to be that of Matthew's welfare. With that in mind the court stated:
[A] ruling that the surrogate contract's
alleged illegality automatically vitiates the
consent, regardless of whether it was otherwise freely given, would deprive the court
of the power to order an adoption it found to
be in Matthew's best interests, and would
fail to preserve the integrity of the only family he has ever known. 30
Citing Stewart v. Stewart, the court thus concluded that "the
best interests "of the child control custody determinations,
regardless of the parties agreement. "31

2.

Use of stepparent adoption procedure

Nancy's second argument contended that the stepparent
adoption procedure was unavailable in this instance. She
stated that section 7005(b)32 of the Uniform Parentage Act in
27. [d., citing, Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, at 576, 184 F.2d 688
(1947). (Action for dissolution ofa partnership.)
28. [d., citing, Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, at 258-259,160 P.2d 900
(1945). (Action for an accounting of partnership property.)
29. [d., citing, Guthrie v. Times·Mirror Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 879, at 885, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1975). (Action by seller for recision of contract.)
30. [d. at 1258.
31. [d., citing, Stewart v. Stewart, 130 Cal. App. 2d 186, at 193, 278 P.2d 441 (1955).
(Custody case involving the children of divorced parents. Stipulation by the parties as
to custody did not prohibit the admission of evidence as to the mother's fitness.)
32. CAL. Crv. CODE §7005(b) drafted to protect married women using artifical
insemination provides "[tlhe donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use
in artificial insemination ofa woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as
if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." (West 1983).
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the California Civil Code prevented Timothy from being
Matthew's father and thus rendered the paternity judgment
void. The appellate court rejected Nancy's claims. 33
The court, as above, found that Nancy's original petition did
not allege problems with the paternity judgment, Timothy is
referred to throughout the petition as "the natural father".
Secondly, "the judgment or order of the court determining the
existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is determinative for all purposes"·34 Thus, Nancy's challenge was prohibited by collateral estoppel.

3.

Knowledge of her rights

Nancy's third argument was that she did not know her
rights and did not have independent counsel. On appeal, substantial evidence was found to support the trial court's rejection
of this argument. It was held that the consent form itself provided sufficient notice of Nancy's rights. The consent form
warned that the court's execution would deprive Nancy of all custody rights, that court approval would be needed to withdraw,
and also indicated a place to call if she had any questions. 36
Nancy's claim that she lacked independent counsel was
also dismissed. Although her attorney for the contract signing
was paid for by the M's, the evidence showed that he acted independently and on Nancy's behalf. In reaching this conclusion
the court pointed to the numerous changes made to the contract
at Nancy's request. 38
Finally, Nancy testified that she had contacted counsel
whenever she thought it necessary. In fact, prior to signing the
consent form, Nancy had consulted with another attorney
regarding a malpractice suit against the Center.37 At no time
33. In so deciding. the court denied Nancy the same protection that is given to
married women under § 7005. Perhaps the court is merely reflecting the societal value
placed on having two parents, perhaps the message to women runs deeper. At any rate,
single women going through reproductive clinics who thought they were protected from
paternity suits by sperm donors under § 7005(b), cannot count on being protected under
this court's reasoning.
34. Matthew B. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, citing, County of San Diego v. Hotz, 168 Cal.
App. 3d 605, at 608,214 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1985). (Appeal from an order requiring appellant to submit to blood testing to determine the probability of his being father of child
conceived by wife during marriage. Held, contest precluded by collateral estoppel.)
35. [d., at 1260.
36. [d. at 1261.
37. This suit was against the Center for Reproductive Alternatives regarding malpractice in connection with treatment to facilitate Nancy's pregnancy.
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did Nancy choose to consult an attorney regarding the consent
to adoption.

4.

Promise of visitation.

Nancy's final argument, that withdrawal of consent was reasonable under the circumstances, charged the trial court with
error in finding that the M's had not made a false promise of
visitation and for finding that Nancy did not rely on that
promise of contact prior to signing the consent. The appellate
court, citing three factors, upheld the trial court ruling.
First, there was the surrogate contract itself. In the contract Nancy warranted a lack of desire on her part to have a
parent-child relationship with the child that would be born. 38
Secondly, and most damaging was a provision that had been
modified at Nancy's request. That provision, as requested by
Nancy, stipulated that she would "not seek to view the infant
[c]hild after the child leaves the hospital".89 Third, several letters written by Nancy supported the finding that she understood that there would be no visitation with the child in the
future. 40 In light of this evidence, and a provision in the contract requiring that amendments be in writing, the trial court
rejected Nancy's claim of an unwritten modification.
B.

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

The second test that a petition to withdraw consent must
pass is that the withdrawal must be in the best interests of the
child. Best interest, like the above reasonable under the
circumstances test, rests on a number of intangible factors.
Again, the trial court could only be reversed only if there was
clear abuse of discretion. The best interest standard does not
compare a situation to an absolute, rather it holds it in comparison to an available alternative; here, the M's versus
Nancy.4!
As a result of signing the consent to adoption, Nancy lost
the preference given to natural parents. That loss was
38. Matthew B. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239 at 1262.
39.1d.
40.1d.
41. 1d., citing, Adoption of Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, at 707,117 Cal. Rptr.
856, 84 A.L.R. 3d 654 (1975). (Appeal from judgment denying petition for custody.
Proposed parents were 71 and 55 years of age. Held, Superior Court abused its discretion by denying petition solely on the basis of age. Reversed with directions.)
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critical in that it shifted the burden to Nancy, to make a positive showing that withdrawal would be in Matthew's best
interests. 42 The court, focusing on Matthew's bonding and need
for stability, and on the relative fitness of the parties as parents, held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's decision that withdrawal of consent would not be in
Matthew's best interest.
III.

CONCLUSION

In his conclusion Justice Chin, writing for the majority,
summarized the potential problems in this area of law:
Surrogacy raises many constitutional, public policy, and human questions that we do
not discuss in this opinion. It is, of course,
for the Legislature to consider these important questions and provide answers through
legislative action ... Absent legislative guidance, the courts of necessity will ultimately
be called upon to determine the questions
associated with surrogacy... 43
In the absence of guidance from the Legislature, the implication is clear that these cases will continue to be resolved by
looking to the best interests of the child. This is as it should
be, and undoubtedly will prove to be in the best interests of
society as a whole.
Problems arise in cases where the mother has not signed a
consent to adoption, and therefore has not lost the parental
preference. In those cases custody by the mother must be
shown to be detrimental to the child, not merely against the
best interests of the child. It is in this type of case where the
cout:'ts, without legislation, must struggle with the ethics of
applying traditional contract law as an alternative.
Surrogate parenting and its related issues are highly
charged and emotionally sensitive areas, reaching the very
42. Id., citing, Adoption of Jenny L., 111 Cal. App. 3d 422, at 429, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 695 (1980). (Appeal from judgment allowing natural mother to withdraw consent to adoption. Held, trial court applied the wrong standard when it failed to
determine best interest of the child. Instead, the trial court had applied the parental
preference standard which requires only that withdrawal not be detrimental to the
child. Reversed and remanded with directions.)
43. 1d. at 1273-1274.
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foundations of our beliefs in the fundamental rights to procreate and parent. The absence of legislative guidance will
inevitably result in many inequities due to the highly discretionary nature of decisions on these issues. At this point
in time, the consequences of choosing surrogate parenting
are impossible to guarantee. The potential cost both to
society and to the individuals involved is great and it is up to
the Legislature to act now in providing guidance ....

Susan M. Crocker*

44. As this note goes to press, Senator Diane Watson has introduced the
Alternative Reproduction Act. Already passed by the Senate and now before the
Assembly Judiciary Committee, the bill would legalize paid surrogacy [either pregnancy through artificial insemination or implantation of a fertilized egg] and paid egg
donations [for in vitro fertilization].
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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C.

ADOPTION

1.
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An adopted child does not have a fundamental right
to a family.

Adoption of Kay C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 741,_Cal. Rptr._
(1991). In the Adoption of Kay C.,l the California Court of
Appeals held that an adopted child does not have a fundamental right to a family, nor are the mentally ill a suspect class
requiring a strict scrutiny analysis. Instead, the court held that
an adoptive child has only the amount of rights as bestowed by
the adoption statutes. 2
FACTS
At six years old, Kay C.'s natural parents became unable to
care for her and Kay was placed with foster parents. After two
years, Kay's natural parent's relinquished all rights to her,
making Kay eligible for adoption.
When the adopting parents (respondents) became interested
in Kay, they requested all available information on her background. However, they never received certain reports suggesting Kay should remain with her foster parents. One court
appointed evaluator recommended to the Department of Social
Services3 that Kay stay with her foster parents because the
secure relationship was important for Kay.· In fact, Kay herself asked to remain with the foster family.6 Instead, the
Department of Social Services followed the recommendation of
Dr. Albert DeRanieri, Kay's therapist, who decided she was
ready for adoption. 6
For unstated reasons, the adopting parent's anticipated Kay
might have trouble adjusting to a new home. While they were
willing to help Kay make the transition to her new life with
them, the adopting parents were unwilling to adopt a child with
1. Adoption ofKsy C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 741, _ Cal.Rptr. _ (1991).
2. Id. at 753·54.
3. The Department of Social Services for the State of California makes decisions
concerning whether children should be placed for adoption. A licensed agency, in this
case The Children's Home Society of California, actually places the children with
prospective parents.
4. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 746.
5.ld.
6.ld.
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severe emotional problems, "specifically a psychotic or violent child".7
Kay and her adoptive family regularly attended therapy sessions to help Kay adjust to her new environment. Despite these
sessions, Kay's behavior became increasingly erratic and
unpredictable. Several months before the finalization of the
adoption, Kay was diagnosed as having a borderline personality
disorder with psychological defenses of splitting, projection and
denial. 8 Again, the adopting parents were never told of the
extent of Kay's psychological problem until after the final
adoption decree. 9
Two years after the adoption, Kay was diagnosed as psychotic, and she exhibited paranoid, delusional thinking. lo Kay
began accusing her new parents of child abuse and threatened
to call the police. II Kay also accused her adoptive mother of trying to choke her.12 Respondents became unable to handle
Kay's increasingly unstable behavior. Consequently, Kay was
placed in a horne for emotionally disturbed children. IS
Respondent's sought to abrogate the adoption under
California Civil Code section 227b, which permits vacation of
an adoption in certain situations. I. The statute directs the
adoptive parents to present evidence that the child had a
"developmental disability or a mental illness as a result of conditions prior to the adoption to such an extent that the child
cannot be relinquished to an adoption agency on the grounds
that the child is considered unadoptable."J6 The statute also
requires that the parents had no knowledge or notice of the condition prior to the final decree and that the petition for vacation be filed within five years of the entry of the final decree. IS
COURT'S ANALYSIS
The trial court found Kay C. did have serious mental prolems resulting from conditions prior to her adoption. The court
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10. Id. at 747.
11. Id. at 746.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 747.
14. Cal. Civ. Code § 228.10 (227b renumbered with change by statutes 1990,
Chapter 1363 (Assem Bill No.3532» (West 1982).
15. Id.
16.Id.
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also decided the respondents did not have knowledge or notice
of her condition, Kay's mental problems rendered her unadoptable and finally it was in Kay's best interest that the adoption
be vacated. 17 The criterion the court used for determining best
interest includes, consideration of "the welfare of the child, the
extent, nature, duration and prognosis as to the disability of
the child, the degree of dependency, the length of the adoption,
and the bonds of affection or attachment. "18
Kay asserts that section 227b violates both the due process
and the equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. Kay
maintains she is entitled to a strict scrutiny analysis because
she has a fundamental right to a family and because her mental illness places her in suspect class.
The California Court of Appeals rejected both of Kay's
arguments. First, the court examined whether an adoptive
child has a fundamental right in the family unit. The court
concluded that natural children and parents have a fundamental right in the family unit. 19 However, the court refused
to extend this right to include adoptive children. 2D The court
stated, that "under certain circumstances, an adoptive child,
like the natural child has a liberty interest in his or her family relationship. "21 However, the court found that section 227b
does not trespass on any of Kay's fundamental rights to family. The court reasoned the creation of Kay's relationship with
her adoptive family was statutory and contractual.
Consequently, her potential fundamental rights could not
extend to termination proceedings which are also statutory.
The court stressed that statutory rights do not create fundamental rights. 22 While in contrast, the court found the biological family, is not based in state law, but "in intrinsic human
rights," there is an adequate basis for the distinction between
natural and adoptive family rights. 23
17. Kay, 228 Cal App. 3d at 747.
18. Id. at 752 (citing Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d
I, 6, 8 Cal. Rptr. 354,459 P.2d 897 (1969».
19. See Moore v. East Cleveland 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977): Smith v. City of
Fontina, 818 F.2d. 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
20. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 750.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 749-50 (citing Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U. S. at 503.) The Claimed interest derives from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with the state, it is appropriate to ascertain from state law the expectations and entitlement of the parties. Id.
23. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 749 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).
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The court emphasized adoption is not a common law concept,
but instead an idea contemplated by statute and contract.24
Looking carefully at the criteria required for a legal adoption,
the court found, "(T)he proceeding is essentially one of contract
between the parties whose consent is required. "26 The judiciary
oversees that the criteria is properly executed. 28
Continuing with the idea that the adoption relationship is
contractual, the court referred to section 227b as the "the legislative perceived equivalent of mistake ... ".27 The court
observed that other sections of the adoption code allow for
vacation of the adoption, if the termination of the natural
parents rights were obtained through fraud, duress or mistake. 28 Extending this reasoning to the adoptive parents, the
court found that they were deprived all the relevant information concerning Kay's condition, "which if·known would have
affected their agreement to adopt."29 The court declared that
parents need all available information to make a decision and
if the information is not provided, "Section 227b serves retrospectively to remedy this gap in the vital information process."30 The court found this was a valid reason for maintaining
section 227b.
The court also dismissed Kay's equal protection argument.
Kay contended that section 227b discriminates against developmentally disabled and mentally ill adopted children. 3t Kay
argued the mentally ill form a suspect class and deserve the
protection of strict scrutiny.
Rejecting Kay's argument for strict scrutiny, the court
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision, Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 32 which held mentally
retarded persons are not a suspect class. The court in Cleburne
24. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 750.
25.Id.
26. Id. (citing Estate of Taggert, 190 Cal. 493,498,213 P. 504 (1923). The criterion
used by the court in Taggert is as follows: 1. That the person adopting is ten years older
than the child, 2. that all the parties whose consent is required do consent, fully and
freely, to the making of such contract, 3 that the adoption contemplated by the contract will be for the best interest of the child. Id.
27. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 751.
28.Id.
29.Id.
30.Id.
31. Id. at 753. Kay asserts that since the statute doesn't apply to physically ill
or emotionally healthy adopted children that the statute is discriminatory.
32. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,445-46 (1985).
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reasoned, "it would be too difficult to find a principled way to
distinguish a variety of groups who have perhaps immutable
disabilities ... One need only mention this in respect to the
aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. "S3 Further
the court intoned that no other California court had ever found
the mentally ill formed a suspect class."
Kay also claimed her interest in family was a fundamental
right under the equal protection clause thus requiring strict
scrutiny. Kay argued the principles used by the California
Supreme Court to hold education as a fundamental right under
the equal protection clause of the California Constitution,
should be extended to the adoptive family relationship.36 Without
further discussion, the court again firmly stated that Kay's
rights were limited to those found in the adoption statutes. 58
Dismissing a strict scrutiny analysis because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class were at stake, the court
employed the rational relation test of minimal scrutiny. Using
the rational relation test, the court explained it "must determine
whether the Legislature could have reasonably found the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state interest."37
The court determined that the legislative purpose of section
227b is to promote adoption, "and thus promote the welfare of
children available for adoption. "38 The court found this was a
legitimate state interest.
Kay protested that no evidence showed the statute actually
promoted adoption. 39 Having determined that section 227b's
purpose was valid, the court stated they were not required to
look into whether the statute successfully fulfilled its
purpose. 40 The court also commented that the specific
33. Id. at 445-56.
34. Kay, 228 Cal.App.3d at 753-754. See In He Eugene W., 29 Cal App. 3d 623, 105
Cal. Rptr. 736 (1972), The court stated the distinction between physical and mental illness is "amply warranted" by reason of the differing nature of the two disabilities.
35. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 753-54.
36.Id.
37. Id. at 754 (citing Western & Southern L.I. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 671-72 (1981».
38. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 755 (citing Department of Social Welfare, 1 Cal.3d
at 6.)
39. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 755.
40. Id. at 755 (citing Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co. 449 U.S. 456, 466,
(1981). "the constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does not
depend on a court's assessment of the empirical success or failure of a measures provisions.-)
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provisions of section 227b, such as the five year statute of
limitations, and the requirement that the mental illness exist
prior to the adoption were extremely reasonable.
Finally, the court observed that while adoption codes are
designed to further children's interests, prospective parents
must also be given consideration. The court examined the
various factors adopting parents need to evaluate when deciding whether to adopt and or terminate the adoption." The court
found the ability to form emotional bonds was paramount and
determinative of whether a relationship should be initiated or
continued. 42 The court noted some parents, though aware of
section 227b may chose to continue the relationship with the
child, but in other cases, setting aside the relationship might
be best for all parties. 43 For Kay, the court found setting aside
her adoption was best.
CONCLUSION

In support of the court's abrogation ofthe adoption is the fact
that Kay may be more harmed by staying with a family who
doesn't want her. The court emphasized that adopting parents
could not form an emotional bond with Kay. However, left unaddressed are Kay's emotional needs. For determining Kay's best
interest, the court relied on the trial court's discretion." Yet, how
the trial court applied the best interest test of Department of
Social Welfare 46 remains unclear. In this situation there does not
appear to be any good solutions, and regardless of the court's
decision, Kay's future seems bleak.

Theresa M. Kolish *

Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d. at 756.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 752.
45. See supra note 18.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.

41.
42.
43.
44.
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Insurance Companies are required to cover female
insureds for pregnancy and childbirth but are allowed
to rely on questionably discriminatory methods when
pricing these policies.

Kirsh v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 233 Cal. App.
3d 84, 284 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1991). In Kirsh v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, t the California Court of Appeal
reversed a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance Company.
The Court of Appeal found that defendant's challenged pricing
policy was permissible. 2 Although this policy, on its face, violated
the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act)S, the court held that the
more specific anti-discrimination statute found in the Insurance
Code· superseded the Unruh Act. 5 The court reached this conclusion because the Insurance Code applied specifically to
rates charged by insurance companies. 6
The court did find that the insurance company violated the
Unruh Act when it omitted coverage for costs of normal pregnancy and childbirth from the health insurance policy issued
to the plaintiff.?
FACTS
Plaintiff was 36 years old when she first purchased a hospital-surgical policy and catastrophic rider from defendant. 6 At
that time the policy premium was $564.60 per 6 month period
as opposed to $344.90 if the policy had been issued to a man
similarly situated. 9 This price disparity continued throughout
the plaintiff's five year period of coverage. to Because plaintiff's
1. Kirsh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 3d 84, 284 Cal. Rptr.
260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (modified)
2. 1d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr 265.
3. Cal. Civil Code §51 (West 1982)
4. Cal. Ins. Code §10140 (West 1972)
5. Higher premiums were charged to plaintiff, a woman, than to a man similarly
situated. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264
6. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal Rptr. at 265
7. 1d. at 92,284 Cal. Rptr at 266.
8. 1d. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr at 262.
9. 1d. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
10. 1d. at 88, 284 cal. Rptr at 262.
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policy did not include coverage for normal pregnancy and
childbirth, defendant offered plaintiff a pregnancy rider for an
additional $633.00 per six month period. 11 Plaintiff declined this
rider. 12
Plaintiff challenged as arbitrary discrimination two of the
insurance company's practices: 1) charging women higher premiums than men, and 2) excluding coverage for pregnancy and
childbirth from policies issued to women while omitting no conditions which are unique to men 13 from policies issued to men. 14
Defendant responded with three arguments which it alleged
permitted it to disparately price: 1) the Unruh Act does not
apply to the life and disability insurance industry because an
insurance company is not a business establishment within
the meaning of the Unruh Act, 2) the Insurance Code permits
gender based premiums and exclusion of pregnancy and childbirth coverage, 3) the actuarial research which justified the disparity in premiums rendered its practice non arbitrary
discrimination within the meaning of the Unruh Act 16
COURT'S ANALYSIS
Addressing the first argument, the court found that the
defendant was a business establishment by relying on the
broad definition of the term as promulgated by O'Connor v.
Village Green Homeowners Ass'n. 16 The defendant was subject
to the Unruh Act, however the court found that only some of
its practices violated it.17 The court reached this conclusion by
separating plaintiff's allegations of discrimination into two
issues: 1) discrimination which affects the rates charged women,
and 2) discrimination which affects the terms ofpolicies issued
11. Id at 88, 262
12. Id. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 262.

13. Conditions which are unique to men include prostate cancer and testicular
cancer.
14. Id. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
15. Id. at 89, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
16. The term "business establishment" embraces everything about which one can
be employed, and it is often synonymous with "calling, occupation, or trade engaged
in for the purpose of making a livelihood or gain." The word "establishment" as
broadly defined includes ... a permanent "commercial force or organization." O'Connor
v. Village Green Homeowner's Ass'n 33 Cal.3d 790,795, 662 P.2d 427,430,191 Cal Rptr.
320, 323 (1983)
17. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 90,284 Cal. Rptr. at 263
18. Id. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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to women l8 • These two issues were then subjected to an
analysis under the Unruh Act l9 and Insurance Code §10140 20 •
The court stressed that the purpose of the Unruh Act is to
interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise21 • The court reaffirmed the public policy determination it
made in Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors 22 ; specifically the inclusion of "sex" in the Unruh Act is clearly a declaration of California's public policy mandate and objective that
men and women be treated equally.23 In light of this public policy mandate, the court declared that the defendant's practices on their face could not escape the scrutiny of the Unruh
Act.:U The court stressed that "... were our inquiry limited to the
Unruh Act, summary judgment in favor of the defendant clearly would be improper. "26
However, the existence of the Insurance Code itself compelled the court to expand the scope of its analysis beyond the
application of the Unruh Act. The court did so by focusing on
defendant's argument that Insurance Code §10140 supersedes
the Unruh Act and thereby permits gender based premiums as
19. The Unruh Act provides in pertinent part: All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
or ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of very kind whatsoever. Cal. Civil Code §51 (West 1982)
20. Insurance Code §l0140 provides in pertinent part: No admitted insurer,
licensed to issue life or disability insurance, shall fail or refuse to accept an application for that insurance, to issue that insurance to an applicant therefore, or issue or
cancel that insurance, under conditions less favorable to the insured than in comparable cases, except for reasons applicable alike to persons of every race, color, religion,
national origin, ancestry or sexual orientation. Race, color, religion, national origin,
ancestry or sexual orientation shall not, of itself, constitute a condition or risk for which
a higher rate, premium, or charge may be required of the insured for that insurance.
Cal. Ins. Code §10140 (West 1972)
21. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264
22. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors 178 Cal App. 3d 1035,224 Cal.
Rptr. 213 (1986), afrd, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
23. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264
24. On the issue of differential pricing the court cites from Koire v. Metro Car
Wash which held that, "differential pricing based on sex is detrimental to both men
and women because it reinforces harmful stereotypes and is not permissible merely
because it is profitable. Koire v. Metro Car Wash 40 Cal.3d 24, 32- 38,707 P.2d 195,
219 Cal. Rptr 133 (1985)
On the issue of the terms of the policy the court relies on Colorado Civil Rights
Com. v. Traveler's Ins. Co. which held, "(t)he failure to provide coverage for the
treatment of pregnancy in an otherwise comprehensive insurance policy discriminates
against women on the basis of sex as surely as, for example, the failure to provide coverage for the treatment of prostate conditions in a comprehensive policy would discriminate against men on the basis of sex." Colorado Civil Rights Com. v.Traveler's
Ins. Co. 759 P.2d 1358, 1364 (Colo. 1988)
25. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 91, 284 Cal. Rptr 264
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well as exclusion of pregnancy and child birth from the terms of
coverage. 28 The defendant urged the court to rely on a plain reading of Insurance Code §10140 and the Unruh Act and find that
because sex is omitted from the Insurance Code statute but
mentioned in the Unruh Act, the Unruh Act did not apply to the
defendant's practices involving discrimination based on sex.27
Faced with these two anti discrimination statutes, one
general (the Unruh Act) the other specific (Insurance Code
§10140), the court resorted to two basic statutory principles of
construction: 1) that a specific statute governs a general
statute, and 2) where one statute contains a provision regarding one subject and a similar statute omits such a provision
regarding a related subject this omission is an indication of different legislative intent.28
In applying these principles of statutory interpretation, the
court concluded the Unruh Act was not applicable to defendant's practice of charging women higher premiums than
men. 29 It was able to so conclude by relying on the plain reading of the two statutes as urged by defendants. Because the
Insurance Code omits sex from its list of proscribed discrimination and the Unruh Act clearly includes sex in its list the
court read a legislative intent to allow insurance companies to
consider the sex of the insured when issuing or canceling policies. so This legislative intent is bolstered by the failure of the
Legislature to include "sex" when it revised Insurance Code
§10140 to include "sexual orientation" in 1990. 31
However, the court did not accept defendant's argument that
Insurance Code §10140 allowed it to exclude coverage for pregnancy and childbirth from the policies it issued to women. 32 The
court reached this conclusion because Insurance Code §10140
applies only to the issuance or cancellation of policies. 33 The
Unruh Act remains in full force regarding the issue of terms of
coverage in defendant's policies. 34 The court, relying on
Colorado Civil Rights Com. v. Traveler's Insurance CO.,36 read26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
1988)

[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 264.
[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 264.

[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 265.
[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 265.
[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 265 and see supra Note 18
[d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
Colorado Civil Rights Com. v. Traveler's Insurance Co. 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo.
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ily found that failure to cover the plaintiff for costs of normal
pregnancy and childbirth is a violation of the Unruh Act. 3s
DISCUSSION
The court was quick to rely on general principles of statutory construction when conducting its analysis of the Unruh Act
and Insurance Code §10140. However, there is one statutory
principle of construction which the court did not consider.
This is the principle that a specific statute will not govern a
general statute if the legislative intent is that the general
statute should be of universal application notwithstanding
the specific statute. 37
Arguably the Unruh Act is a general statute meant to be of
universal application. The discussion in Rotary Club of Duarte
v. Board of Directors 3S is persuasive on this point:
"The Unruh Act is to be liberally construed with a view of
effectuating the purposes for which it was enacted and to promote justice... One of the policies underlying the enactment of
the Unruh Act is the eradication of discrimination by private
or public action on the basis of sex by 'business establishments' in the furnishing of accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services.'"
In view of this language, it is difficult to perceive that the
Unruh Act was not meant to be universally applied. The court
conceded defendant's practice of charging women higher premiums than men is clearly discriminatory and thus violates the
Unruh Act. 39 In spite of this, the court chose not to invoke a universal application of the Unruh Act.
One must bear in mind that the court "chose" to base its finding on a reconciliation of the two statutes (and therefore prompted the most damaging result). The court did not consider
defendant's third argument; that the actuary tables on which
it based its rates rendered gender specific premiums non36. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal Rptr. at 265
37. 58 Cal. Jur.3d Statutes §l09 (1980) provides in part: (A) special statute
dealing expressly with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and
take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject....But this rule
has no application if the two statutes can be reconciled ...or if it is manifest that the
legislative intention is that the general act should be of universal application notwithstanding the special act.
38. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035,224 Cal.
Rptr. 218 (1986), afrd, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
39. Kirsh 233 Cal. App. 3d at 91, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264
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arbitrary discrimination,40 thus not violative of the Unruh
Act 41 . Although the end result of exploring this argument
might have been the same42 , the implications might have been
less harmful to the integrity of the Unruh Act. Further, in
choosing to selectively apply the Unruh Act to defendant's
practices by stating that a specific statute can supersede this
general anti-discrimination statute, this court is permitting
clever "result driven" drafting by the legislature (or insurance
companies) that results in practices which the Unruh Act
specifically prohibits.
On a positive note, the court did announce that it is gender
based discrimination and a violation of the Unruh Act to omit
coverage for normal pregnancy and childbirth from comprehensive health insurance policies issued to women. 4S This
issue had never been decided by the court, and its willingness
to rely on a Colorado Supreme Court case is significant."
Although the court cites only that portion of Colorado Civil
Rights Com. v. Traveler's Ins. CO.46 which unequivocally declares
that failure to cover pregnancy and childbirth in a comprehensive health insurance policy is gender based discrimination,
it implicitly accepts the reasoning used by the Colorado court
to reach its decision. In Colorado Civil Rights Com. v.
Traveler's, the Colorado Supreme Court clearly stated that
an insurance company is discriminating against its insureds,
based on their gender, when the insurance company fails to
cover its female insureds for pregnancy and childbirth". Its
holding rejected framing the issue of such discrimination in
non-gender based terms which would have compelled an analysis that this policy failed to cover women for pregnancy and
40. In support of the motion defendant submitted the declaration of an actuary
who stated: Defendant charges women in the 20-64 age group a higher premium for
the policy than it charges men in the same age group; this result is consistent with
and justified by defendant's claim cost experience which shows that defendant pays
out more in health care benefits to women than to men in the 20-64 age group. Kirsh
233 Cal. App. 3d 88, 284 Cal. Rptr 262-3
41. [d. at 89, Cal. Rptr. at 263.
42. If defendant had shown that the actuary tables on which premium decisions
were made did not include in its variables the frequency and cost of claims related to
pregnancy and childbirth defendant's argument would have been strong. If however, the defendant had included frequency and cost of claims for pregnancy and childbirth among the variables in its actuary tables, clearly their pricing policy would be
discriminatory. Not only would they be charging women more than men, but they
would be charging women more based on the frequency and cost of conditions for which
they refused to cover women absent an additional policy or rider.
43. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 266.
44. [d. at 90-1, 284 Cal. Rptr at 264.
46. Colorado Civil Rights Com. v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 769 P.2d 1368 (Colo. 1988).
46. [d. at 1361
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childbirth based on its effect on pregnant women versus nonpregnant people. 4? By primarily referring to Colorado Civil
Rights Com. v. Traveler's and citing two other cases which
also reject such a formulation 48 the California Court of Appeal
has joined those states who have unequivocally stated that
pregnancy is an issue which is framed by gender. 49
However, what appears to be a bold step is merely an empty
gesture. The court stated that pregnancy is an issue framed by
gender, but with the same breath gave insurance companies a
green light to arbitrarily discriminate against women when
determining the premiums for policies issued to women. While
mandating that insurance companies insure women for pregnancy and childbirth, the court still refuses to protect women
from potentially discriminatory pricing policies. Failure to
determine whether defendant's practices constitute arbitrary
or non-arbitrary discrimination gives insurance companies no
guidelines by which they may determine the premiums they
charge. For example, may insurance companies base their
premium for a policy without coverage for pregnancy and childbirth (if a woman agrees that she does not wish to be covered
for these conditions) on an actuary table which includes the frequency and cost of covering insureds for those very conditions?
The court's failure here to investigate just how pricing decisions
are reached may open the floodgates to unjustifiably higher
rates charged to women than to men. Consider that if the
plaintiff had accepted the pregnancy rider the full amount of her
insurance per year would have amounted to $2,395.20 as
opposed to $689.80 for a man similarly situated.
Perhaps as a result of Kirsh the cost of policies issued to
women will be grossly disproportionate as compared to policies
issued to men. Before Kirsh they were only slightly disproportionate.

Jel!sica Rudin*

47. 1d. at 1361
48. Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Com. 268 N.W. 2d 862
(Iowa 1978); Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination 375 Mass. 160,375 N.E. 2d 1192 (1978)
49. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 91,284 Cal. Rptr. at 264
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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